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1CHAPTER 1. Introduction
1.1 Electricity Markets Restructuring
Electric power industries around the world have undergone restructuring - from government
regulated to more market oriented. The aim of restructuring the industry has been to reduce
monopoly power enjoyed by a few players in the industry and promote more private investment
in generation, transmission and distribution facilities leading to greater competition. The US
foray into restructuring electricity markets started in the late 1990’s, but got off to a disastrous
start with the spectacular collapse of California market in the beginning of 2001. Many of the
lessons from the episode have been learned and corrected but many issues still remain to be
researched.
1.2 Wholesale Power Markets Overview
Electric power systems have traditionally been operated as natural monopolies. Restructur-
ing has entailed unbundling of hitherto vertically integrated organizations into independently
managed generation, transmission and distribution systems. As a result, electric power markets
can be divided into wholesale and retail layers.
The wholesale power market design proposed by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) in an April 2003 white paper FERC (2003) encompasses the following core
features: central oversight by an independent system operator (ISO); a two-settlement system
consisting of a day-ahead market supported by a parallel real-time market to ensure continual
balancing of electric power supply and demand.
In this new environment, electricity is traded like other commodities in ISO organized power
pools. However, power systems must be in instantaneous power balance, i.e. demand must
2equal supply at all times. Moreover, at present, electric power cannot be stored economically
in substantial amounts. The power flows on transmission systems are governed by physical
laws of power flow such as the Kirchoff’s law, and are constrained by the overall capacity of
transmission lines. During the peak hours of electric power demand, the above mentioned
constraints become binding affecting outcomes throughout the grid. Transmission constraints
in particular create congestion, which can impede the generation and/or injection of electric
power into the grid in “merit-order”, i.e., from least-cost generator to high-cost generators.
Electric power prices can be very volatile and hence, new forms of risk have arisen due to the
restructuring.
As part of restructuring, congestion on electricity transmission grids is now handled in
many energy regions by means of locational marginal pricing (LMP), i.e., the pricing of electric
energy in accordance with the location of its injection or withdrawal from the grid. The LMP
so calculated at a node k measures the least cost to supply an additional unit of load at that
location from the resources of the system. The difference in LMPs at any two buses is known
as congestion rent, which is collected by the ISO. In the case of grid congestion, LMPs can vary
widely across the grid, which creates price risk for all market participants.
Using existing market design features, this thesis investigates the risk management issues
of market participants and overall efficiency of the wholesale power markets. Additionally, I
also study the market rules dealing with renewable energy sources.
1.3 Original Contributions
The thesis consists of the following chapters. The first chapter is titled An Agent-Based Test
Bed Study of Wholesale Power Market Performance Measures, and it presents the difficulties
in objectively measuring the market power of various market participants owing to the physical
characteristics of electricity. Using a wholesale power market test-bed (AMES), we study the
efficacy of various traditional, as well as newly proposed measures of market performance in
a dynamic setting, with learning agents. An earlier version (Somani and Tesfatsion (2008)) of
the work reported in this chapter was published in IEEE Computational Intelligence Magazine,
in November 2008. The paper was jointly written with Dr Leigh. Tesfatsion.
3The second chapter is titled Financial Risk Management in Electric Power Markets: Lit-
erature Review, and it introduces the concept ofprice risk in restructured power markets. We
present a brief scenario illustrating the origin of price risk. We also introduce various measures
market participants employ to hedge against those risks. We then provide the definition of Fi-
nancial Transmission Rights (FTR) and how those can be used along with Bilateral Contracts
to fully hedge against price risk. The chapter also presents a survey of research on implications
of FTR market design on overall wholesale power market efficiency.
The fourth chapter is titled Study of Joint Bidding Strategies in Physical and Financial
Electric Power Markets Using Analytical and Agent-Based Models, and it presents a study
of joint bidding strategies of market participants in inter-linked financial and physical energy
markets. Specifically, we study how generation companies bid into ISO organized FTR auctions
based on their expectations of payoffs in the day-ahead energy markets, and the subsequent
supply offer strategies in the day-ahead market, in order to maximize joint net-earnings from
energy sales and FTR revenues. The results show that pure strategy Nash-supply function
equilibria exist only for certain portfolios of FTRs. It is also observed that the strategic
behavior of generation units changes dramatically for different congestion patterns in the grid.
However, even for a simple setup with two identical generators, it is not easy to solve the
problem using purely analytical methods. Hence, we use agent-based computational methods
to solve for the joint decision making problem. Generation companies (GenCos) are modeled
as adaptive learners in both the markets, interacting repeatedly with other GenCos until they
converge to “stable” action choices in the two markets. The results show that the GenCos are
able to learn optimal strategies, based on their spatial location on the grid. Additionally, the
GenCos can systematically coordinate their strategies in the two markets.
The fifth chapter is titled Strategic Wind Trading by Firms with Mixed Portfolio of Gen-
eration Assets, and it presents the strategic incentives of companies with both conventional
units and wind plants, to under/over-report wind supply offers in day-ahead markets, relative
to the expected wind power output in real-times markets. The use of analytical and numerical
methods demonstrates the strategic incentives of mixed generation portfolio companies.
4CHAPTER 2. An Agent-Based Test Bed Study of Wholesale Power
Market Performance Measures
Wholesale power markets operating over transmission grids subject to congestion have dis-
tinctive features that complicate the detection of market power and operational inefficiency.
This study uses a wholesale power market test bed with strategically learning traders to ex-
perimentally test the extent to which market performance measures commonly used for other
industries are informative for the dynamic operation of restructured wholesale power markets.
Examined measures include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the Lerner Index (LI), the
Residual Supply Index (RSI), the Relative Market Advantage Index (RMAI), and the Opera-
tional Efficiency Index (OEI).
2.1 Introduction
The U.S. electric power industry is currently undergoing substantial changes in both its
structure (ownership and technology aspects) and its architecture (operational and oversight
aspects). These changes involve attempts to move the industry away from highly regulated
markets with administered cost-based pricing and towards competitive markets in which prices
more fully reflect supply and demand forces.
The goal of these changes is to provide industry participants with better incentives to control
costs and introduce innovations. The process of enacting and implementing policies and laws
to bring about these changes has come to be known as restructuring .
This restructuring process has been controversial. The meltdown in the restructured Cali-
fornia wholesale power market in the summer of 2000 has shown what can happen when market
mechanisms with poorly designed incentive structures are implemented without proper testing.
5Following the California crisis, many energy researchers have eloquently argued the need to
combine sound physical understanding of electric power and transmission grid operation with
economic analysis of incentives in order to develop electricity markets with good real-world
performance characteristics.
Many commercially available packages for power system analysis now incorporate compo-
nents critical for the simulation of restructured electricity markets (e.g. optimal power flow
solvers). However, these packages have three major drawbacks.
First, the critical effect of incentives on human participant be haviors is typically not ad-
dressed. Second, the proprietary nature of these packages generally prevents users from gaining
a complete and accurate understanding of what has been implemented, restricts the ability of
users to experiment with new software features, and hinders users from tailoring software to
specific needs. Third, the concern for commercial applicability to large-scale real-world sys-
tems makes these packages cumbersome to use for research, teaching, and training purposes
requiring intensive experimentation and sensitivity analyses.
In response to these concerns, a group of researchers at Iowa State University has been
working to develop the AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed.1 AMES is an agent-based
computational laboratory suitable for studying the dynamic performance of restructured whole-
sale power markets in a manner that addresses both economic and engineering concerns. A
key aspect of the AMES project is the release of AMES as open-source software to encourage
interdisciplinary communication and cumulative enhancements.
AMES incorporates core elements of a wholesale power market design recommended by
the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in an April 2003 White Paper FERC (2003).
This design recommends the operation of wholesale power markets by Independent System
Operators (ISOs) or Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) using locational marginal
prices (LMPs) to price energy by the location of its injection into or withdrawal from the
transmission grid.
1Detailed descriptions of AMES can be found in refs. (Sun and Tesfatsion (2007b,a); Li et al. (2008a,b)).
AMES is an acronym for Agent-based M odeling of E lectricity Systems. The first version of AMES was released
as an open-source Java software package at the IEEE PES General Meeting in June 2007. Downloads, manuals,
and tutorial information for all AMES version releases to date can be accessed at AME ().
6Figure 2.1 Energy regions operating under variants of FERC’s market design
As shown in Fig. 2.1, variants of FERC’s proposed wholesale power market design have now
been adopted in many regions of the U.S. These regions include New England (ISO-NE), New
York (NYISO), the mid-atlantic states (PJM), the midwest (MISO), the southwest (SPP), and
California (CAISO). According to Joskow (2006), over 50% of generating capacity in the U.S.
is now operating under some variant of FERC’s market design.
AMES models electric power sellers (generation companies) with learning capabilities inter-
acting over time with electric power buyers (load-serving entities) in an ISO-managed wholesale
power market. This market operates over an AC transmission grid subject to congestion. The
ISO manages congestion on the grid by means of LMPs derived from optimal power flow solu-
tions.
This study explores the potential usefulness of test beds such as AMES for practical energy
policy concerns. Specifically, we use AMES to experimentally test the extent to which market
performance measures commonly used for other industries are informative for the dynamic
operation of restructured wholesale power markets.
7In particular, we focus on the measurement of “seller market power” and “market efficiency”
relative to a “competitive equilibrium ” benchmark. Competitive equilibrium is said to hold for
a market when all traders take prices as given in the formulation of their demands and supplies,
and the market price is then set to equate total market demand to total market supply. Seller
market power refers to the ability of a seller to profitably raise the market price of a good
relative to competitive equilibrium conditions. Market efficiency measures the degree to which
the total net surplus (value) secured by sellers and buyers through actual market operations
matches the maximum total net surplus that sellers and buyers would secure under competitive
equilibrium conditions.
The organization of this study is as follows. The main features of the AMES test bed are
outlined in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 we elaborate on several special factors complicating
the detection and prevention of seller market power and the measurement and attainment of
market efficiency in restructured wholesale power markets. In particular, we show that the
standard ISO optimal power flow objective function used to manage these markets deviates
systematically from the standard economic measure for market efficiency when grid congestion
is present.
In Section 2.4 we provide careful definitions for the specific seller market power and market
efficiency measures to be experimentally examined in this study. We start with two commonly
used measures for seller market power, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Lerner
Index (LI). We then present the Residual Supply Index (RSI) recently developed by CAISO
researchers as a test for seller market power in wholesale power markets. We next explain
the Relative Market Advantage Index (RMAI), a market performance measure developed by
Nicolaisen et al. (2001) as a necessary condition for seller market power. Finally, we examine a
measure for efficient market operations referred to as the Operational Efficiency Index (OEI).
Section 2.5 sets out a simple experimental design permitting comparisons of the strengths
and weaknesses of each of these measures relative to its intended purpose. Section 2.6 presents
some of our main experimental findings to date.
8Figure 2.2 AMES test bed architecture
2.2 The AMES Test Bed (Version 2.01)
AMES(V2.01) incorporates, in simplified form, core features of the wholesale power market
design proposed by the U.S. FERC (2003); see Fig. 2.2. A detailed description of these features
can be found in materials provided at the AME () homepage.
Below is a summary description of the logical flow of events in the AMES(V2.0) wholesale
power market:
• The AMES wholesale power market operates over an AC transmission grid starting on
day 1 and continuing through a user-specified maximum day (unless terminated earlier
in accordance with a user-specified stopping rule). Each day D consists of 24 successive
hours H = 00,01, ...,23.
• The AMES wholesale power market includes an Independent System Operator (ISO) and
a collection of energy traders consisting of Load-Serving Entities (LSEs) and Generation
Companies (GenCos) distributed across the busses of the transmission grid. Each of these
entities is implemented as a software program encapsulating both methods and data; see,
e.g., the schematic depiction of a GenCo in Fig. 2.3
9Figure 2.3 AMES GenCo: A cognitive agent with learning capabilities
• The objective of the ISO is the reliable attainment of appropriately constrained oper-
ational efficiency for the wholesale power market, i.e., the maximization of buyer and
seller total net earnings (surplus) subject to generation and transmission constraints.
• In an attempt to attain this objective, the ISO undertakes the daily operation of a day-
ahead market settled by means of locational marginal pricing (LMP), i.e., the determi-
nation of prices for electric power in accordance with both the locating and timing of its
injection into, or withdrawal from, the transmission grid. Roughly stated, a locational
marginal price at any particular transmission grid bus is the least cost to the system of
servicing demand for one additional megawatt (MW) of electric power at that bus.2
• The objective of each LSE is to secure power for its downstream (retail) customers.
During the morning of each day D, each LSE reports a demand bid to the ISO for the
day-ahead market for day D+1. Each demand bid consists of two parts: a fixed demand
2In reality, LMPs are shadow prices for “nodal balance constraints” constituting part of the constraint set
of optimal power flow problems and are derived as derivatives of the optimized power flow objective function
with respect to particular types of perturbations of these constraints. Moreover, these nodal balance constraints
are imposed at “pricing nodes” that might not correspond to actual physical bus locations on the grid. For
expositional simplicity, throughout this study we use the standard engineering short-hand description for LMPs
as valuations for single-unit increases in demand and we treat pricing nodes as coincident with transmission grid
busses. For a more rigorous explanation and derivation of LMPs, see Sun and Tesfatsion (2007a).
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bid (i.e., a 24-hour load profile); and 24 price-sensitive demand bids (one for each hour),
each consisting of a linear demand function defined over a purchase capacity interval.
LSEs have no learning capabilities; LSE demand bids are user-specified at the beginning
of each simulation run.
• The objective of each GenCo is to secure for itself the highest possible net earnings each
day. During the morning of each day D, each GenCo i uses its current action choice
probabilities to choose a supply offer from its action domain ADi to report to the ISO
for use in all 24 hours of the day-ahead market for day D+1.3 Each supply offer in ADi
consists of a linear marginal cost function defined over an operating capacity interval.
GenCo i’s ability to vary its choice of a supply offer from its action domain ADi permits
it to adjust the ordinate/slope of its reported marginal cost function and/or the upper
limit of its reported operating capacity interval in an attempt to increase its daily net
earnings.
• After receiving demand bids from LSEs and supply offers from GenCos during the morning
of day D, the ISO determines and publicly reports hourly power supply commitments and
LMPs for the day-ahead market for day D+1 as the solution to hourly bid/offer-based
DC optimal power flow (DC-OPF) problems. Transmission grid congestion is managed
by the inclusion of congestion cost components in LMPs.
• At the end of each day D, the ISO settles all of the commitments for the day-ahead
market for day D+1 on the basis of the LMPs for the day-ahead market for day D+1.
• At the end of each day D, each GenCo i uses stochastic reinforcement learning to update
the action choice probabilities currently assigned to the supply offers in its action domain
ADi taking into account its day-D settlement payment (“reward”). In particular, as
depicted in Fig. 2.4, if the supply offer reported by GenCo i on day D results in a
3In the MISO (2008), GenCos each day are actually permitted to report a separate supply offer for each hour
of the day-ahead market. In order to simplify the learning problem for GenCos, the current version of AMES
restricts GenCos to the daily reporting of only one supply offer for the day-ahead market. Interestingly, the
latter restriction is imposed on GenCos by the ISO-NE (2008) in its particular implementation of FERC’s market
design. (Baldick and Hogan, 2002, pp. 18-20) conjecture that imposing such limits on the ability of GenCos to
report distinct hourly supply offers could reduce their ability to exercise seller market power.
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Figure 2.4 AMES GenCos use stochastic reinforcement learning to determine the supply offers
they report to the ISO for the day-ahead market.
relatively good reward, GenCo i increases the probability of choosing this supply offer on
day D+1, and conversely.
• There are no system disturbances (e.g., weather changes) or shocks (e.g., forced generation
outages or line outages). Consequently, the binding financial contracts determined in the
day-ahead market are carried out as planned and traders have no need to engage in
real-time (spot) market trading.
• Each LSE and GenCo has an initial holding of money that changes over time as it accu-
mulates earnings and losses.
• There is no entry of traders into, or exit of traders from, the wholesale power market.
LSEs and GenCos are currently allowed to go into debt (negative money holdings) without
penalty or forced exit.
• The activities of the ISO on a typical day D are depicted in Fig. 2.5. The overall dynamical
flow of activities in the wholesale power market on a typical day D in the absence of system
disturbances or shocks is depicted in Fig. 2.10.
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Figure 2.5 AMES ISO activities during a typical day D
Figure 2.6 Illustration of AMES dynamics on a typical day D in the absence of system dis-
turbances or shocks for the special case of a 5-bus grid
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2.3 Measurement Conundrums for Power Markets
2.3.1 Detection of Seller Market Power
Although the exercise of seller market power in restructured wholesale power markets can
have substantial adverse effects on the efficiency, reliability, and fairness of market operations,
it is difficult to construct measures for its reliable detection. Excellent discussions elaborating
some of the reasons for this can be found in Borenstein et al. (1999), Sheffrin et al. (2004),
(Stoft, 2002, Chapter 4), and Twomey et al. (2005). Here we briefly review the key issues.
On the one hand, the complexity of the rules and regulations governing market operations
in restructured wholesale power markets creates opportunities for GenCos to game the system
to their advantage through strategic behaviors, either individually or in tacit collusion. These
strategic behaviors take two main forms: economic withholding of capacity through a reporting
of higher-than-true marginal costs; and physical withholding of capacity .
Economic withholding of capacity can induce higher prices for cleared supply as well as out-
of-merit-order dispatch, i.e., more expensive generation dispatched in place of less expensive
generation. This results in inefficient (and politically important) transfers of wealth away from
LSEs and their downstream (retail) consumers and towards GenCos.
Physical withholding of capacity can induce higher prices for the remaining offered capacity
and hence higher net earnings for GenCos that withhold only a portion of their capacities. It
can also result in out-of-merit-order dispatch. In addition, however, physical withholding of
capacity increases the chances of inadequacy events in which offered capacity is insufficient to
meet total fixed demand, forcing ISOs to take special actions to avoid the breakdown of power
flow on the grid.
In short, strategic withholding results in distorted price signals as well as the possible need
for special non-market dispatch. This hinders the efficient and fair use of existing resources as
well as the proper assessment of future transmission and generation investment needs.
On the other hand, the physical laws governing power flow on transmission grids mean that
these grids are strongly connected networks. Injections or withdrawals of power at one location
on the grid can have substantial effects on branch flows and bus sensitivities at distant locations.
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In particular, if an injection of power at a particular grid location leads to grid congestion, this
will cause at least some separation of LMPs across the grid. Indeed, as explained more carefully
in Subsection 2.3.2, under congested conditions LMPs can strictly exceed the marginal cost of
every individual GenCo at the system operating point, despite the complete absence of any
deliberate exercise of seller market power.
Alternatively, a change in the pattern of grid congestion can cause dramatic discontinous
changes in LMP levels even if the overall number of congested branches remains the same.
For example, a load pocket can suddenly emerge in which a GenCo effectively becomes a high-
priced monopolist with respect to the demand for power in its local area because outside power
cannot be transported into this local area. In standard economic terminology, the energy market
has segmented into submarkets, and the electric power quantities offered for sale at locations
within distinct submarkets now effectively represent distinct goods supporting a distinct array
of prices.
Standard economic measures for seller market power have not been designed with these
complex effects in mind. Consequently, their usefulness for the detection of seller market power
in restructured wholesale power markets is not clear.
2.3.2 Measurement of Market Efficiency
The standard economic measurement of “market efficiency” also has to be carefully recon-
sidered for restructured wholesale power markets. Market efficiency means there are no wasted
resources. Wastage can be identified as being of two types: (1) physical wastage, in the sense
that some valued units of resource remain unused; and (2) wastage of value, in the sense that
some units of resource are not being used by those who value them most.
The efficiency of a market can be measured in terms of the “total net surplus” attained
by buyers and sellers. Net buyer surplus is defined to be the maximum amount that a buyer
would have been willing to pay for a quantity of goods q minus the actual payment that the
buyer makes for q. Similarly, net seller surplus is defined to be the payment received by a
seller for the sale of a quantity of goods q minus the minimum payment the seller would have
been willing to accept in payment for q. The total net surplus (TNS) attained in a market M
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Figure 2.7 Illustration of a competitive equilibrium (Q*,P*) = (5,$65) with corresponding
calculations for net buyer and seller surplus. The range of all possible competitive
equilibria is given by Q*=5 and $60 ≤ P ∗ ≤ $70.
during a specified time period T is then defined to be the sum of the net surplus attained by
all buyers and sellers in M during T.
Market efficiency is said to be achieved in a market if TNS is maximized, since wastage
of resources is then minimized. In standard textbook market settings, TNS is maximized in
competitive equilibrium, that is, when all buyers and sellers in the market take prices as given
in the formulation of their demands and supplies and the market price P* equates total market
demand to total market supply at some common quantity level Q*. The equilibrium quantity
Q* is the summation of all of the cleared quantities q∗i supplied by individual sellers i, that
is, the quantities q∗i that can be scheduled for purchase because for each successive quantity
unit the market price lies between some buyer’s maximum willingness to pay and the seller’s
minimum acceptable price.
See, for example, the depiction of a competitive equilibrium in Fig. 2.7 with accompanying
calculations for net buyer and seller surplus. The demand curve D depicts buyer maximum
willingness to pay for each successive unit demanded, in descending order, and the supply curve
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S depicts seller minimum acceptable sale price for each successive unit supplied, in ascending
order. The eight quantity units offered for sale might all belong to a single seller that is not
capacity constrained. Alternatively, the eight units could represent units offered for sale by
different capacity-constrained sellers—e.g., eight different sellers, each capacity-constrained to
supply at most one unit. In either case only five of these units can be cleared in competitive
equilibrium because buyer maximum willingness to pay drops below seller minimum acceptable
sale price for any additionally offered quantity units.
Economists typically equate a seller’s minimum acceptable sale price with its marginal
cost. It is common to test for the maximization of TNS at a point (Q’,P’) by testing whether
the market price P’ lies between MC−(Q’) and MC+(Q’), the left-hand and right-hand seller
marginal costs evaluated at the market output level Q’.4 If seller marginal cost is a well-defined
continuous function of Q at Q’, then left-hand and right-hand seller marginal costs coincide at
Q’ and this requirement reduces to the standard condition P’=MC(Q’).5 If P’ exceeds right-
hand seller marginal cost at Q’, this raises the possibility that additional buyer/seller surplus
could be extracted from the market by the sale of additional quantity units. It also raises
the possibility that sellers are exercising market power through the deliberate withholding of
capacity.
Due to network externalities, however, this P/MC test must be applied with great caution in
restructured wholesale power markets operating over transmission grids with congestion man-
aged by LMP pricing. To understand why, it is necessary to consider carefully the constructive
derivation of LMPs.
As noted in Section 2.2, the LMP at each bus of the transmission grid is defined as a
right-hand system marginal cost: namely, the least cost to the system of servicing an additional
4Assuming the seller minimum acceptable sale prices in Fig. 2.7 are marginal costs, the depicted competitive
equilibrium (Q*,P*)=(5,$65) satisfies precisely this type of requirement, as follows: $60 = MC−(Q*) < P*=$65
< MC+(Q*) = $80. A similar requirement can be formulated stating that the market price P’ should lie between
the left-hand and right-hand expressions for buyer maximum willingness to pay at Q’. Both of these requirements
follow from the following alternative geometrically-expressed form for the definition of competitive equilibrium
in standard market contexts: A technologically feasible quantity-price combination (Q’,P’) is a competitive
equilibrium if and only if it is an intersection point of the market demand and supply curves with all vertical
and horizontal portions included.
5Marginal cost curves for power markets typically have jump points due to generation capacity constraints.
See (Stoft, 2002, Chapter 1-6) for a careful discussion of marginal cost calculations for power markets.
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megawatt (MW) of electric power demand at that bus. By definition, then, each LMP is
determined only by the marginal GenCos at the system operating point, i.e., by the GenCos
that are capable of supplying additional demand because they are currently operating strictly
below their upper capacity limits.
Consequently, as is well understood, the LMP received by each individual non-marginal (i.e.,
capacity-constrained) GenCo for each MW it sells at its operating point can strictly exceed
its left-hand marginal cost.6 The MWs supplied by these non-marginal GenCos constitute
“inframarginal” quantity units in the terminology of standard microeconomic theory, similar
to the quantity units to the left of Q*=5 in Fig. 2.7.
What is not as well understood, however, is that an LMP can strictly exceed the right-hand
marginal cost of each marginal GenCo if grid congestion requires out-of-merit-order dispatch.
For example, to service an additional MW of demand at some bus k for some hour H in the
presence of grid congestion might require that less expensive generation at some second bus k′
be backed down, e.g., by 2MWs at $20/MWh, and that more expensive generation at some third
bus k′′ be brought up, e.g., by 3MWs at $30/MWh, in order to avoid overloading an already
constrained transmission grid branch. In this case the system marginal cost of servicing an
additional MW of demand at bus k for hour H—i.e., the LMP at bus k for hour H—is $50/h =
[3MWs·($30/MWh) - 2MWs·($20/MWh)]. If the 3MWs at $30/MWh are supplied by a GenCo
that has even more operating capacity available at a marginal cost not exceeding $49/MWh,
then the LMP at bus k strictly exceeds the right-hand marginal cost of this marginal GenCo.
2.3.3 Attainment of Market Efficiency
Subsection 2.3.2 discusses a number of issues that seriously complicate the measurement
of market efficiency for day-ahead markets in restructured wholesale power markets. However,
a potentially more fundamental problem is that the form of the objective function used by
ISOs in these markets to determine LMPs and power commitments renders problematic the
attainment of market efficiency.
6The marginal cost curve of a capacity-constrained GenCo goes vertical at its upper capacity limit, implying
that the right-hand marginal cost of a GenCo operating at its upper capacity limit is effectively infinite.
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This issue is extremely important but fairly technical to explain. For this reason we delay
discussion of this issue until subsection 2.4.3, below, so that we can exploit the previous devel-
opment of a quantitative measure for market efficiency specifically tailored for wholesale power
markets.
2.4 Market Performance Measures
2.4.1 Seller Market Power Measures
Market concentration is the extent to which a relatively large share of market activity is
carried out by a relatively small number of participant firms. Market concentration is routinely
used as an indicator of potential seller market power by the U.S. Department of Justice in
antitrust actions as well as by researchers in academic studies. The intuitive idea is that
anticompetitive behavior by firms is to be expected in a market that is highly concentrated.
Market concentration measures are most often applied to the seller side of a market. Typ-
ically these measures depend critically on two structural attributes: (a) the number of firms
selling into a market; and (b) the relative “market share” of these seller firms as measured either
by output, by operating capacity, or by sales revenues. All else equal, these measures indicate
an increase in concentration either when the number of firms decreases or when the market
share of the largest firms increases. A key unresolved issue in the construction of such mea-
sures is the relative weight that should be attached to the two structural dimensions (a) and (b).
One of the most commonly used market concentration measures is as follows:
• The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI):
Let sn denote the percentage share of market output of the nth largest firm in a market
with N firms for some time period T. Then
HHI =
N∑
n=1
s2n (2.1)
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Note that market share in (2.1) is defined as the percentage share of market output . Conse-
quently, the corresponding HHI is an ex post measure in the sense it depends on actual market
outcomes.
Larger values for HHI indicate a higher degree of concentration and hence a higher potential
for the exercise of seller market power. For example, if a market consists of just one firm, then
the percentage share of market output for this one firm will be 100% and HHI will equal 10,000
(1002). Conversely, if a market consists of a large number of small firms, the percentage share
of market output for each of these small firms will be close to 0%, implying that HHI will
have a value close to 0. However, the HHI has well known deficiencies as an indicator of seller
market power in any market. For example, it focuses only on the the supply side of a market,
ignoring demand conditions, and it ignores differences in firm costs and the potential entry of
rival firms; see (Pepall et al., 1999, Section 2.1).
One of the most commonly used direct measures for seller market power is the “Lerner
Index,” defined as follows:7
• Lerner Index (LI):
For any firm i supplying a positive quantity q at a per-unit sale price P in some time
period T,
LI(i) =
[
P −MCi(q)
P
]
, (2.2)
where MCi(q) denotes firm i’s true left-hand marginal cost, evaluated at q.
The LI builds on the idea, explained and critiqued in Subsection 2.3, that positive discrepancies
between market price and seller marginal cost indicate the possible exercise of seller market
power through the withholding of capacity.
For later purposes, we now specialize definition (2.2) to wholesale power markets operating
under LMP pricing. Consider a GenCo i located at a bus k(i) in day D. Let pGi denote the
total amount of electric power that GenCo i is cleared to sell in the day-ahead market for
7The definition of the Lerner Index is typically presented without distinguishing between left-hand and right-
hand marginal cost, important for the consideration of capacity-constrained firms; see, e.g., Stoft (Stoft, 2002,
p. 339). In empirical applications, however, the “marginal costs” appearing in Lerner Index calculations appear
universally to be left-hand (historically realized) marginal costs. Consequently, we state the definition in this
form.
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hour H of day D+1. Also, let LMPk(i) denote the LMP at bus k(i) in hour H of day D+1.
By definition, LMPk(i) is the sale price that GenCo i is scheduled to receive for each MW of
its cleared supply pGi. Finally, let MCi(pGi) denote GenCo i’s true left-hand marginal cost,
evaluated at pGi. Then
LI(i) =
[
LMPk(i) −MCi(pGi)
LMPk(i)
]
(2.3)
We next present a measure that considers both the demand and supply sides of a market
by building on the concept of a “pivotal supplier.” A firm i participating in some market M is
called a pivotal supplier if total operating capacity in M without the capacity of firm i is not
sufficient to meet market demand.
Although relevant for any market, the concept of a pivotal supplier has special salience for
restructured wholesale power markets for which much of the bid-in demand is fixed , i.e., not
sensitive to price.8 More precisely, electric power effectively cannot be stored, and imbalances
between demand and supply of electric power on a grid lead to voltage instabilities and ultimate
grid collapse if not swiftly corrected. For these reasons, ISOs in wholesale power markets must
ensure at all times that generation capacity is sufficient to meet total fixed demand. This
requirement means that GenCos in restructured wholesale power markets who are pivotal
suppliers for total fixed demand have tremendous potential to exercise seller market power
through the withholding of their capacity.
The following “Residual Supply Index” tests for the pivotal-supplier status of arbitrary
groupings of firms participating in a market.
• Residual Supply Index (RSI):
Let N denote the collection of all firms participating in a market during some time period
T. For any subset S of N , let TotalCap(S) denote the total operating capacity of the firms
in S during T. Also, let TotalDemand denote total demand during T. Then
RSI(S) =
[
TotalCap(N)− TotalCap(S)
TotalDemand
]
(2.4)
8For example, in the U.S. Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO), LSEs are permitted to submit
demand bids to the ISO for the day-ahead market that have both both price-sensitive and fixed parts. However,
according to demand bid data released by the MISO MISO (2008), at the present time only about 1% of the
total bid-in demand for the day-ahead market is price sensitive.
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If RSI(S) < 1, the indication is that the firms in S have potential seller market power because
total demand cannot be met without their capacity. When total demand and firm capacities are
known in advance, the RSI represents an ex ante measure in the sense that it can be calculated
in advance of actual market outcomes.
The RSI in various forms was first proposed by a group of researchers affiliated with the
Department of Market Analysis at the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). See
(Sheffrin et al., 2004, p. 60) for a report on empirical findings for these measures applied to
CAISO market data. See, also, Mani and Ainspan (2005) for applications of RSI(1) to the New
England wholesale power market (ISO-NE).
Finally, we present the definition of a market performance measure proposed in Nicolaisen
et al. (2001) as a necessary indicator of market power for either a buyer or seller. Here we
specialize the measure to a seller.
• Relative Market Advantage Index (RMAI):
Let NetEarnC(i) denote the net earnings that a seller i would earn in competitive equi-
librium during some time period T, and let NetEarnA(i) denote the net earnings of seller
i in actual market trading during T. Assuming NetEarnC(i) is not zero,
RMAI(i) =
[
NetEarnA(i)−NetEarnC(i)
NetEarnC(i)
]
(2.5)
In order for seller i to have profitably exerted control over the market price during T, RMAI(i)
must necessarily be positively valued. Consequently, RMAI(i) > 0 is a necessary condition for
seller i to have exercised seller market power during T.
2.4.2 Market Efficiency Measure
Recall from Subsection 2.3.2 that market efficiency is said to hold for a market if maximum
extraction of total net surplus (TNS) is achieved. Moreover, for standard market contexts such
as depicted in Fig. 2.7, maximum TNS extraction is achieved in any competitive equilibrium.
Let M denote a standard market context in some time period T. Let TNSC denote the
(maximum) TNS that could be extracted in market M in period T in competitive equilibrium,
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and let TNSA denote the TNS actually extracted in market M during T. Assuming TNSC is
positively valued, an “Operational Efficiency Index” can be defined for market M during T as
follows:
• Operational Efficiency Index (OEI):
OEI =
TNSA
TNSC
(2.6)
If buyers never purchase goods above their maximum willingness to pay and sellers never sell
goods below their minimum acceptable sale price, OEI ranges between 0 and 1 in value with
OEI=1 corresponding to 100% market efficiency.
For later purposes, we now specialize the definitions of net buyer surplus, net seller surplus,
total net surplus, and OEI to markets for electric power. In particular, we consider the case
of J LSEs and I GenCos participating in an ISO-managed day-ahead wholesale power market
operating under LMP pricing.
In standard economic terminology, an LSE that has a positive fixed (price-insensitive)
demand for electric power has a vertical demand curve for these quantity units, implying
an infinite maximum willingness to pay for them. If this fixed demand must be met under
all circumstances, as is true in ISO-managed day-ahead markets, then the LSE obtains the
same infinite benefit from its fixed demand independently of any other market circumstances.
Consequently, this benefit does not help to distinguish between the efficiency of different market
scenarios because in effect it cancels out when the benefits arising under any two market
scenarios are differenced.
For this reason, power economists routinely omit consideration of LSE fixed demand benefits
in the construction of measures designed to evaluate relative market efficiency. A special case
of this is when all LSE demand is fixed and attention is focused solely on minimization of the
total variable costs incurred in satisfying this fixed demand. Here we consider the more general
case, reflective of many actual ISO-managed day-ahead wholesale power markets, in which LSE
demand bids consist of both both fixed and price-sensitive parts.
Consider an LSE j located at a transmission grid bus k(j) in some day D. Let pSLj and p
F
Lj
denote the quantities of electric power that LSE j is cleared to buy in the day-ahead market
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for hour H of day D+1 corresponding to its price-sensitive demand-bid function Dj(p) and its
fixed demand bid, respectively. LSE j’s total cleared demand is thus given by
pLj =
[
pSLj + p
F
Lj
]
(2.7)
Also, let LMPk(j) denote the LMP for bus k(j) in hour H of day D+1. LMPk(j) is the price
that LSE j is committed to pay for each MW of its total cleared demand (2.7).
The net buyer surplus of LSE j corresponding to its total cleared demand (2.7), adjusted to
omit the infinitely-valued benefit corresponding to its fixed demand, takes the following form:
AdjNBSLj =
∫ pSLj
0
[Dj(p)] dp− LMPk(j) · pLj (2.8)
In (2.8), Dj(p) denotes LSE j’s maximum willingness to pay for an increment dp of power,
evaluated at the power level p. Consequently, the integral term measures the benefit gained
by LSE j from the price-sensitive portion pSLj of its total cleared demand pLj , whereas the
far-right term denotes the cost to LSE j for its total cleared demand pLj .
Next consider a GenCo i located at a transmission grid bus k(i) in some day D. Let pGi
denote the quantity of electric power that GenCo i is cleared to sell in the day-ahead market
for hour H of day D+1. Also, let LMPk(i) denote the LMP for bus k(i) in hour H of day
D+1. LMPk(i) is the price that GenCo i is committed to accept in payment for each MW of
its cleared supply pGi.
The net seller surplus of GenCo i corresponding to its cleared supply pGi is therefore given
by
NSSGi = LMPk(i) · pGi −
∫ pGi
0
[MCi(p)] dp (2.9)
In (2.9), MCi(p) denotes GenCo i’s true left-hand marginal cost (minimum acceptable sale
price) for an increment dp of power, evaluated at the power level p. Consequently, the integral
term measures the true variable cost incurred by GenCo i for its cleared supply pGi, whereas
LMPk(i) · pGi measures the payments received by GenCo i for this cleared supply.
The total net surplus attained in the day-ahead market in hour H of day D+1, adjusted by
omission of the infinite benefit corresponding to LSE fixed demand, thus takes the following
24
form:
AdjTNS =
J∑
j=1
AdjNBSLj +
I∑
i=1
NSSGi (2.10)
We consider two different calculations of AdjTNS:
• AdjTNSC : AdjTNS calculated under competitive benchmark conditions in which the ISO
knows the true structural attributes of all LSEs and GenCos;
• AdjTNSR: AdjTNS calculated under auction conditions in which the ISO must depend on
the reported demand bids and supply offers of potentially strategic LSEs and/or GenCos
with learning capabilities.
In parallel with (2.6), we then define an “adjusted” operational efficiency index as follows:
AdjOEI =
AdjTNSR
AdjTNSC
(2.11)
The Adjusted OEI (2.11) does not have as straightforward an interpretation as the stan-
dardly defined OEI (2.6). For example, AdjTNS calculated under either competitive or auction
conditions can be negatively valued in the presence of LSE fixed demands since LSE fixed de-
mand payments are included but LSE fixed demand benefits are not. Moreover, as elaborated
in the following section, the standardly assumed ISO objective function for the day-ahead mar-
ket does not guarantee that AdjTNSC equals maximum possible AdjTNS. These issues will be
further addressed in Section 2.6, where we present experimental findings for AdjOEI.
2.4.3 ISO Objective Function and Market Efficiency
It is typically assumed that an appropriate market objective for policy makers is market
efficiency interpreted to mean the maximization of the sum of net buyer and seller surplus,
i.e., total net surplus (TNS). As depicted in Fig. 2.7, TNS in standard market contexts can
be expressed as the area between the market demand curve and the market supply curve, and
maximum TNS is achieved where these curves intersect.
The basic objective typically assumed for ISOs in day-ahead markets is the constrained
maximization of the area between the market price-sensitive demand curve and the market
supply curve as constructed from the reported price-sensitive demand bids and supply offers
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of the participant traders.9 It is commonly believed that the constrained maximization of
this ISO objective function is equivalent to the constrained maximization of adjusted TNS as
constructed in (2.10) and hence comports well with standard economic policy prescriptions for
the achievement of market efficiency. See, for example, (Cramton et al., 2005, Appendix 1.3,
pp. 42-44). However, it will now be shown that this is not necessarily the case.
Consider, for example, an ISO-managed wholesale power market consisting of J LSEs and
I GenCos. Let the objective function of the ISO in day D for hour H of the day-ahead market
in day D+1 be expressed as follows:
BR − CR =
J∑
j=1
∫ pSLj
0
[
DRj (p)
]
dp−
I∑
i=1
∫ pGi
0
[
MCRi (p)
]
dp (2.12)
In 2.12, DRj (p) denotes LSE j’s reported price-sensitive demand function, hence the correspond-
ing summed integral expression BR denotes the reported total benefits to LSEs corresponding
to their reported price-sensitive demand bids (i.e., the area under their reported price-sensitive
demand functions up to their cleared demands). MCRi (p) denotes GenCo i’s reported marginal
cost function, hence the corresponding summed integral expression CR denotes the reported
total variable costs incurred by GenCos (i.e., the area under their reported marginal cost curves
up to their cleared supplies).
The question is whether the objective function (2.12) is equivalent to AdjTNS as constructed
in (2.10). To see why this is not true in general, consider the following. The payments from
LSEs and to GenCos for the day-ahead market in day D+1 are settled through the ISO at the
end of day D. Let ISONetSurplus denote the net payments collected by the ISO in the day-
D settlement for hour H of the day-ahead market in day D+1. Using previously introduced
terminology, ISONetSurplus can be expressed as follows: J∑
j=1
LMPk(j) · pLj −
I∑
i=1
LMPk(i) · pGi
 (2.13)
Combining (2.8), (2.9), (2.10), (2.12), and (2.13), it is seen that
BR − CR = [AdjTNSR + ISONetSurplus] , (2.14)
9Sometimes additional “unit commitment” costs are also included, such as no-load and start-up costs, but
this does not affect the essential point of this section.
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where AdjTNSR denotes AdjTNS based on reported demand bids and supply offers.
Clearly the maximization of (2.14) subject to generation and transmission constraints will
not typically ensure the maximization of AdjTNS subject to these same constraints. It might
be argued that the inclusion of ISO net surplus in (2.14) along with net buyer and seller
surplus is appropriate, since ISOs are also market participants. However, ISOs are typically
constituted as non-profit organizations, meaning they have a fiduciary responsibility to oversee
energy market operations for the securement of social welfare rather than for the securement
of maximum organizational profits.
Why not simply “correct” the objective function (2.14) by replacing it with AdjTNS (or
AdjTNSR)? The key difficulty here is that the LMPs entering into the expression for AdjTNS
in (2.10) are solved for endogenously within the ISO’s optimization problem as shadow prices
on certain “nodal balance conditions” embodying an important physical constraint on power
flow (Kirchhoff’s Current Law). By construction, these shadow prices measure the marginal
cost to the system of servicing marginal increments of demand at different grid locations. Any
explicit appearance of LMPs as endogenous variables in the ISO’s optimization problem apart
from their role as shadow prices on nodal balance conditions would destroy their interpretation
as shadow prices for these conditions and hence their valid interpretation as system marginal
costs.
Sufficient conditions for equivalence between the constrained maximization of [AdjTNSR +
ISONetSurplus] in (2.14) and the similarly constrained maximization of AdjTNS in (2.10) are
as follows: (1) LSEs and GenCos report non-strategic demand bids and supply offers, implying
that AdjTNSR = AdjTNS; and (2) grid congestion is absent, implying all LMPs collapse to a
single uniform price level. Given condition (2), ISONetSurplus = 0 because the total quantity
of electric power sold equals the total quantity of electric power bought.
How likely are these two conditions to hold? With regard to (1), Li et al. Li et al. (2008b) re-
port AMES experiments indicating that strategic profit-seeking GenCos in restructured whole-
sale power markets typically have an incentive to report supply offers to the ISO that system-
atically misrepresent their true net surplus outcomes. This is the case whether or not grid
congestion is present and whether or not the bid-in demand of LSEs is fixed or price sensitive.
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With regard to (2), grid congestion is quite common within restructured wholesale power
markets in the U.S. and increasingly in other countries as well. In the presence of grid con-
gestion, LMPs can dramatically separate across the grid, hence the prices paid to the ISO
by LSEs can differ substantially from the prices received from the ISO by GenCos. Li et al.
(2008b) report consistently positive ISONetSurplus outcomes in a suite of AMES experiments
for a dynamic 5-bus test case in which grid congestion persistently arises. It is actually a bit
disturbing to realize that maximization of an objective function such as (2.14) could have the
unintended consequence of encouraging the emergence and persistence of grid congestion.
What can be done, then, to ensure that the constrained maximization of [AdjTNSR +
ISONetSurplus] at least approximately achieves the similarly-constrained maximization of Ad-
jTNS? One possible way to help ensure AdjTNSR = AdjTNS would be for an ISO to engage in
suitable monitoring of demand bids and supply offers to discourage strategic reporting. Indeed,
ISOs in the U.S. now routinely have “market monitoring” units for just this purpose.
According to the ISO market reports (PJM (2009),CAISO (2009),MISO (2009),ISO-NE
(2009)) in 2008 for PJM, MISO, ISO-NE and CAISO, the ISO net surplus outcomes are pretty
substantial amounts. PJM reports total congestion costs, interpreted here as the difference
between load payments to the ISO and generation revenues received from ISO, to be $2.66
billion. Congestion cost in MISO for (2008), defined as “the difference in LMP prices across
the interface multiplied by the amount of the (power) transfer,” is approximately $500 million.
A more detailed explanation of net surplus collections in various ISO’s can be found in Li and
Tesfatsion (2010)
The net surplus collections for PJM, MISO, ISO-NE, and CAISO, as detailed in the market
reports, are largely allocated to FTR/CRR holders. For example, as reported in [PJM (2009),
p. 417], PJM allocates its total congestion costs as revenues to FTR holders, including GenCos,
LSEs, and pure speculators with no physical generation or load obligations. Any extra amount
remaining at the end of the year is allocated to LSEs as payment offsets in accordance with load-
ratio shares. Similarly, as reported in [MISO (2009), Section V], MISO distributes its congestion
revenues as payments to FTR holders, including holders of special types of FTRs created to
protect entities with pre-existing agreements to use the transmission system. Surpluses in one
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Figure 2.8 5-bus transmission grid for the dynamic 5-bus test case
month are used to fund shortfalls in other months during each year, with FTR payments being
reduced pro rata if a shortfall persists at the end of the year.
2.5 Experimental Design
All market performance experiments carried out for this study using the AMES test bed
are based on a dynamic 5-bus test case developed by Li et al. (2008b). This test case is
characterized by the following structural, institutional, and behavioral conditions:
• The 5-bus transmission grid configuration is as depicted in Fig. 2.8, with transmission
grid, LSE, and GenCo structural attributes as presented in Li et al. (2008b).10
• In particular, the maximum operating capacities of the five GenCos depicted in Fig. 2.8
are as follows: 110MW for GenCo 1 (G1); 100MW for GenCo 2 (G2); 520MW for GenCo
3 (G3); 200MW for GenCo 4 (200MW); and 600 MW for GenCo 5 (G5). Note that the
next-to-largest GenCo 3 is favorably situated in a potential “load pocket” with respect
to the three LSEs.
10The 5-bus transmission grid depicted in Fig. 2.8 is due to Lally (2002). This grid configuration is now used
extensively in ISO-NE/PJM training manuals to derive quantity and price solutions at a given point in time
assuming ISOs have complete and correct information about grid, LSE, and GenCo structural attributes.
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Figure 2.9 Daily LSE fixed demand (load) profiles for the dynamic 5-bus test case
• Also, GenCo 4 (the “peaking unit”) has the most costly generation. Next in line is GenCo
3. The three remaining GenCos 1, 2, and 5 have more moderate costs.
• The daily fixed demand (load) profiles for the three LSEs are the same from one day to
the next. As depicted in Fig. 2.9, each daily fixed demand profile peaks at hour 17.11
• The learning parameters for each of the five GenCos are set at “sweet spot” values shown
in Li et al. (2008b) to be where the GenCos as a whole earn the highest average daily
net earnings.12 The only factor that changes market outcomes from one day to the next
is GenCo learning.
Since the GenCos rely on stochastic reinforcement learning to determine their supply offers,
multiple runs need to be conducted for each experimental treatment to control for purely
random effects. As in Li et al. (2008b), we conduct thirty runs for each treatment using thirty
distinct random seeds generated using the standard Java “random” class.13 Moreover, only
11These profile shapes are adopted from a case study presented in (Shahidehpour et al., 2002, p. 296-297).
12In particular, we use the GenCo Case(1,1) learning parameter values characterized by α = 1 and β = 100
in Li et al. (2008b).
13See Li et al. (2008b) for these 30 numerical seed values.
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Figure 2.10 Illustration of the construction of the R ratio for measuring relative demand-bid
price sensitivity for the special case R=0.50
one of the five possible stopping rules in AMES(V2.01) was flagged for each experimental run:
namely, the stopping rule requiring that each run terminate at a user-designated day DMax.
The value set for DMax in each run was 1000.
The key treatment factor we consider in this study is the ratio R of maximum potential
price-sensitive demand to maximum potential total demand. More precisely, for each LSE j
and each hour H, let
Rj(H) =
SLMaxj(H)
MPTDj(H)
. (2.15)
In (2.15) the expression SLMaxj(H) denotes LSE j’s maximum potential price-sensitive demand
in hour H as measured by the upper bound of its purchase capacity interval, and
MPTDj(H) = [p
F
Lj(H) + SLMaxj(H)] (2.16)
denotes LSE j’s maximum potential total demand in hour H as the sum of its fixed demand
pFLj(H) and its maximum potential price-sensitive demand SLMaxj(H) in hour H. The con-
struction of the R ratio is illustrated in Fig. ??.
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For our price-sensitive demand experiments we start by setting all of the R values (2.15)
for each LSE j and each hour H equal to R=0.0 (the pure fixed-demand case). We then
systematically increase R by tenths, ending with the value R=1.0 (the pure price-sensitive
demand case). A positive R value indicates that the LSEs are able to exercise at least some
degree of price resistance.
The maximum potential price-sensitive hourly demands SLMaxj(H) for each LSE j are
thus systematically increased across experiments. However, we control for confounding effects
arising from changes in overall demand capacity as follows: For each LSE j and each hour H,
the denominator value MPTDj(H) in (2.16) is held constant across experiments by appropriate
reductions in the fixed demand pFLj(H) as SLMaxj(H) is increased. Specifically, MPTDj(H) is
set equal across all experiments to BPFLj(H), the hour-H fixed-demand level BP
F (H) for LSE
j specified in Li et al. (2008b) for the dynamic 5-bus test case. Consequently, for each tested
R value,
pFLj(H) = [1-R] ∗ BPFLj(H) ; (2.17)
SLMaxj(H) = R ∗ BPFLj(H). (2.18)
Moreover, as R is incrementally increased from R=0.0 to R=1.0, we control for confounding
effects arising from changes in the LSEs’ price-sensitive demand bids by holding fixed the
ordinate and slope values {(cj(H),dj(H)): H=00,...,23} for each LSE j. A listing of the specific
numerical values used can be found in Li et al. (2008b).
2.6 Experimental Findings
This section uses the experimental design outlined in Section 2.5 for the dynamic 5-bus
test case to conduct comparative tests of the five market performance measures developed in
Section 2.4.
In particular, we examine outcomes for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as defined
in (2.1), the Lerner Index (LI) as defined in (2.3), the Residual Supply Index (RSI) as defined
in (2.4) with only fixed demands included in total demand, the Relative Market Advantage
Index (RMAI) as defined in (2.5), and the Adjusted Operational Efficiency Index (AdjOEI) as
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defined in (2.11). Average results are reported for R values ranging from R=0.0 (100% fixed
demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand).
Average HHI and LI results are reported in Tables 2.1 through 2.4 for both the competitive
benchmark case (no GenCo learning) and the learning GenCos case. The averages are based
on 30 runs, each consisting of 1000 time periods (“days”).14 The only factor causing changes in
market outcomes over time in the dynamic 5-bus test case is GenCo learning, hence averages
are separately reported for days 10, 50, 100, and 1000 in Tables 2.2 and 2.4 to check the effects
of GenCo learning on HHI and LI valuations over time.
As noted in Section 2.4.1, larger HHI values indicate a higher degree of market concen-
tration. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that, for each tested R value, HHI is generally higher under
GenCo learning. Moreover, for each indicated day, HHI systematically increases as R increases.
The latter occurs because LSE total cleared demand (fixed plus price sensitive) systematically
decreases as R increases, which results in the larger GenCos 3 and 5 supplying a larger share of
the decreasing electric power output. A key question, addressed below, is whether this higher
indicated concentration at higher R values in fact indicates a greater exercise of seller market
power.
By design, LI is meant to vary directly with seller market power. That is, a higher LI value
is meant to indicate a greater exercise of seller market power.
The average LI results reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 systematically decrease with increases
in R for each indicated day, which suggests that seller market power decreases with increases
in the price sensitivity of LSE demand. The intuition is that the greater price-sensitivity of
demand at higher R values gives LSEs a greater ability to resist higher prices and hence, results
in a lowering of average LMP values. This intuition is supported by the AMES experimental
findings reported in Li et al. (2008b); average LMP systematically declines (along with LSE
total cleared demand) as R increases from R=0.0 to R=1.0 either with or without GenCo
learning, although average LMP is much higher with GenCo learning than without for each
tested R value.
Comparing these average LI results with the earlier discussed findings for average HHI, it
14See Appendix 2.7 for a more detailed explanation of these average outcome calculations.
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seems fair to say that HHI is a misleading indicator of seller market power in the context of
the dynamic 5-bus test case. A similar conclusion is reached by Borenstein et al. (Borenstein
et al., 1999, Section 4) for other market contexts. Conversely, for all of its conceptual faults,
the direction of change in average LI correctly indicates the direction of change in seller market
power.
On the other hand, note in Table 2.4 that average LI for the learning GenCos case system-
atically increases from day 10 to day 1000 for R=0.0 (100% fixed demand), almost doubling
by day 1000. However, average LI first increases and then declines back approximately to its
original level for all positive R values (i.e., all cases for which LSE total cleared demand is par-
tially price sensitive). This suggests that price sensitivity of demand is preventing the learning
GenCos from reaching and sustaining the high seller market power levels achieved with 100%
fixed demand.
RSI values are reported in Table 5.3 for the two largest GenCos 3 and 5, assuming only
fixed demands are considered in the measure for LSE total demand. Since LSE fixed demand
profiles and GenCo capacities are exogenously given and constant from one day to the next
in the dynamic 5-bus test case, RSI is an ex ante measure whose values are also exogenously
determined and constant from one day to the next, independently of whether GenCos learn or
not. Consequently, it suffices to report RSI values for a typical day D with attention limited
to R values for which at least a portion of LSE demand is fixed.
By design, RSI is meant to vary inversely with seller market power. That is, a higher RSI
value for some GenCo is meant to indicate a smaller potential for the exercise of seller market
power. Moreover, an RSI value less than 1 for some GenCo is interpreted to mean that this
GenCo has an absolute potential to exercise seller market power because LSE fixed demand
cannot be met without this GenCo’s capacity.
All of the RSI results in Table 5.3 follow directly from the definition of RSI. In particular,
RSI is smaller for the larger GenCo 5 for each hour and each tested R value. Moreover, for each
hour, each GenCo’s RSI value systematically increases with increases in R (i.e., with decreases
in fixed demand), a direct reflection of the increasing ease with which the smaller fixed demand
can be met from remaining GenCo capacity. Consequently, the implication from these RSI
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results is that seller market power decreases with increases in R.
Moreover, RSI systematically dips down for both GenCos in a neighborhood of the peak
demand hour 17 for each tested R value, with RSI falling below 1 in this time interval for
R=0.0 (100% fixed demand). Consequently, the implication is that the risk of seller market
power is greatest around the peak demand hour 17, particularly so for the case in which all
LSE demand is fixed.
How do the RSI results reported in Table 5.3 compare with the LI results reported in
Tables 2.3 and 2.4? Both sets of results indicate that seller market power decreases with
increases in R. Since LI is a direct indicator of seller market power and RSI is an inverse
indicator of seller market power, these results support the empirically-based finding of (Sheffrin
et al., 2004, pp. 62-63) that the measures LI and RSI are negatively correlated.
Note, however, that RSI exceeds 1 for both GenCos in all hours as soon as R exceeds 0.0,
i.e., as soon as a portion of LSE total cleared demand is price sensitive. An unresolved issue
is the extent to which seller market power can be exercised by GenCos when their RSI values
exceed 1.
As recognized by Sheffrin et al. (2004), a potential weakness of the RSI measure (and the
pivotal supplier concept more generally) is that transmission grid congestion is not taken into
account. Consequently, RSI does not reflect the possibility that a load pocket situation can
emerge that permits a GenCo to exercise substantial seller market power even though its RSI
value exceeds 1.
Indeed, based on data from the California wholesale power market, (Sheffrin et al., 2004,
p. 63) devise the following rule of thumb for a “workably competitive market:” The RSI of the
largest supplier must not be less than 1.1 for more than 5% of the hours in a year. However,
Table 5.3 indicates that the largest GenCo 5, as well as the next-largest GenCo 3, have RSI
values that are well in excess of 1.1 for R values ranging from 0.2 to 0.8. Is it correct to say
that the day-ahead market for the dynamic 5-bus test case is “workably competitive” for these
higher R values?
The LI results in Table 2.4 suggest, to the contrary, that significant seller market power
is still being exercised at these higher R values in the learning GenCos case. The conceptual
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problems with LI detailed in Section 2.3 would normally suggest that caution be exercised in
interpreting these LI results. However, the detailed results for GenCo reported supply offers
obtained by Li et al. (2008b) in a parallel set of AMES experiments clearly show that all of the
learning GenCos are indeed exercising at least some seller market power at all tested R values,
including R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand).
Consider, next, the average RMAI results reported in Table 2.6. By construction, RMAI
is intended to measure the ability of sellers to increase their daily net earnings relative to a
competitive pricing situation. In particular, applied to the dynamic 5-bus test case, RMAI
measures the ability of the learning GenCos to increase their daily net earnings (i.e., their daily
net seller surplus) through strategic reporting of supply offers in comparison to the competitive
benchmark case in which the ISO knows the GenCos’ true costs and capacities. This increase
in daily net earnings is normalized by dividing through by the daily net earnings of the GenCos
in the competitive benchmark.
The average RMAI results reported in Table 2.6 for R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) indicate
that the learning GenCos are able to substantially improve their daily net earnings over time
relative to the competitive benchmark. On the other hand, for higher R values their daily net
earnings first increase relative to the competitive benchmark but then fall back.
This pattern for average RMAI appears similar to the pattern seen in Table 2.4 for average
LI. However, the RMAI standard deviations reported in Table 2.6 are extremely large. This
suggests the need to look at the RMAI findings at a more disaggregated level.
For example, one possible cause of the high RMAI standard deviations in Table 2.6 could be
that the 30 simulation runs upon which the average RMAI results are based, in fact, constitute
two or more distinct “clusters” converging to two or more distinct “attractors” with distinctly
different GenCo daily net earnings outcomes relative to the competitive benchmark. The low-
earnings attractor could represent cases in which interaction effects among the five learning
GenCos hinder the GenCos from co-learning how to implicitly collude on reported supply
offers that ensure high daily net earnings.
The average RMAI results reported in Table 2.6 for each indicated day also show that
average RMAI exhibits a rather substantial increase as R varies from R=0.0 to R=1.0, i.e.,
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as LSE total cleared demand moves from 100% fixed demand to 100% price-sensitive demand.
On the other hand, an examination of the corresponding results for simple Market Advantage
(MA) (i.e., the numerator of RMAI) in Table 2.7 shows the more intuitively expected finding
that—in level rather than relative terms—the daily net earnings of the GenCos substantially
decrease as R varies from R=0.0 to R=1.0.
The problem here is that the denominator of RMAI is not invariant to changes in R, implying
that two potentially offsetting effects are occurring at the same time. As R increases from
R=0.0 to R=1.0, LSE total cleared demand decreases rather substantially in the competitive
benchmark, as do the corresponding daily net earnings of the GenCos. This means that the
decreasing gains from learning at each successively higher R value are being normalized by
an ever smaller competitive benchmark base value. Table 2.6 suggests that the latter effect
dominates, resulting in larger RMAI values as R increases. The bottom line is that cross-R
comparisons of average RMAI are not very meaningful.
Finally, consider the average AdjOEI results reported in Table 2.8. These results display
systematic patterns that resemble some of the patterns seen for average MA in Table 2.7. For
example, for R=0.0 (100% fixed demand), AdjOEI increases for each successive indicated day.
Moreover, for each indicated day, AdjOEI exhibits a rather substantial decrease as R varies
from R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price sensitive demand).
Also, since all of the average AdjOEI results in Table 2.8 are positively valued, the numerator
and denominator for AdjOEI must have the same signs. Consequently,
(AdjOIE < 1) ⇔ | AdjTNSR | < | AdjTNSC | (2.19)
Note that AdjOEI drops below 1 at R=1.0 for each successive indicated day.
However, due to the conceptual problems analyzed at some length in Section 2.4.2, it is
difficult to use relation (2.19) to draw inferences about operational efficiency. The critical
difficulty here is that the denominator of AdjOEI—namely, AdjTNSC—does not necessarily
represent maximum AdjTNS. Rather, AdjTNSCrepresents the AdjTNS outcome for the com-
petitive benchmark case when the ISO undertakes the constrained maximization of [AdjTNS
+ ISONetSurplus]. In the presence of grid congestion, ISONetSurplus can depart substantially
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from zero. For example, in parallel AMES experiments reported in Li et al. Li et al. (2008b) for
the dynamic 5-bus test case, the branch connecting bus 1 to bus 2 is nearly always congested
around the peak load hour 17 for both the competitive benchmark and learning GenCos cases,
resulting in large positive ISONetSurplus outcomes.
The bottom line is that the denominator of AdjOEI needs to be replaced with a more
reliable proxy for maximum achievable adjTNS.
2.7 Calculation of Reported Data Averages and Standard Deviations
Below we explain how we obtained the average Lerner Index (LI) results reported in Ta-
ble 2.4, together with standard deviations, for any specified day D and any specified R value.
Average and standard deviation calculations for the remaining ex post market performance
measures are similarly obtained.
First, for each run r, for each hour H of day D, and for each GenCo i with a positive cleared
power supply pGi for run r during hour H, determine GenCo i’s Lerner Index LI(i,r,H,D) as
in (2.3). Second, for each hour H and for each GenCo i, determine the average of GenCo i’s
Lerner Indices LI(i,r,H,D) across all of the runs r for which he had a positive cleared power
supply for hour H. Third, for each hour H, determine the average of these run-averaged Lerner
Indices across all GenCos i who have a positive cleared power supply during hour H for at least
one run r. Finally, determine the average of these GenCo-averaged and run-averaged Lerner
Indices across all 24 hours H to get AvgLI(D).
For example, if all of the five GenCos have positive cleared supplies for each hour H of day
D in each run r, AvgLI(D) can be expressed as follows:
AvgLI(D) =
[∑23
H=00
∑5
i=1
∑30
r=1[LI(i, r,H,D)]
]
24 ∗ 5 ∗ 30 (2.20)
The corresponding standard deviation StDevLI(D) is then calculated using the “N” defi-
nition (i.e., division by the total number N=[24*5*30] of summed terms rather than N-1), as
follows: √√√√[∑23H=00∑5i=1∑30r=1[LI(i, r,H,D)−AvgLI(D)]2]
24 ∗ 5 ∗ 30 (2.21)
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Table 2.1 Dynamic 5-Bus Test Case: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) results for a typical
day D for the competitive benchmark case (no GenCo learning) as R varies from
R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand)
Day R = 0.0 R = 0.2 R = 0.4 R = 0.6 R = 0.8 R = 1.0
D 4,037.48 4,190.91 4,640.96 5,418.82 6,422.01 6,558.37
(92.33) (287.38) (649.97) (823.19) (585.55) (453.14)
Table 2.2 Dynamic 5-Bus Test Case: Average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) results with
standard deviations on successive days for the learning GenCos case as R varies from
R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand)
Day R = 0.0 R = 0.2 R = 0.4 R = 0.6 R = 0.8 R = 1.0
10 4,314.10 4,848.53 6,135.92 6,933.69 7,263.76 7,660.50
(910.52) (1,406.28) (1,883.14) (2,109.11) (2,235.60) (2,158.85)
50 4,069.60 4,548.91 5,377.97 6,300.46 6,740.58 7,266.92
(970.27) (1,528.33) (2,174.75) (2,347.72) (2,426.82) (2,529.18)
100 3,945.12 4,654.25 6,052.07 6,742.74 6,992.86 7,806.67
(758.27) (1,291.36) (1,978.25) (2,175.19) (2,165.93) (2,150.25)
1000 3,141.35 4,619.71 5,977.48 6,953.54 7,200.11 7,750.79
(916.17) (1,501.05) (1,987.65) (2,230.85) (2,316.82) (2,060.53)
Table 2.3 Dynamic 5-Bus Test Case: Lerner Index (LI) results for a typical day D for the
competitive benchmark case (no GenCo learning) as R varies from R=0.0 (100%
fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand)
Day R = 0.0 R = 0.2 R = 0.4 R = 0.6 R = 0.8 R = 1.0
D 0.0053 0.0035 0.0029 0.0022 0.00 0.00
(0.0431) (0.0383) (0.0320) (0.0237) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 2.4 Dynamic 5-Bus Test Case: Average Lerner Index (LI) results with standard de-
viations on successive days for the learning GenCos case as R varies from R=0.0
(100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand)
Day R = 0.0 R = 0.2 R = 0.4 R = 0.6 R = 0.8 R = 1.0
10 0.3098 0.2961 0.2498 0.1837 0.1589 0.1338
(0.2646) (0.2535) (0.2432) (0.2181) (0.2035) (0.1866)
50 0.3356 0.3271 0.3206 0.2542 0.2173 0.1610
(0.2905) (0.2734) (0.2680) (0.2622) (0.2482) (0.2142)
100 0.3979 0.3286 0.2816 0.2364 0.2024 0.1491
(0.3169) (0.2657) (0.2571) (0.2497) (0.2291) (0.1992)
1000 0.6049 0.3200 0.2433 0.1873 0.1621 0.1266
(0.2861) (0.2892) (0.2517) (0.2321) (0.2209) (0.1947)
Table 2.5 Dynamic 5-Bus Test Case: Residual Supply Index (RSI) values by hour for the two
largest GenCos 3 and 5 during a typical day D for the learning GenCos case as R
varies from R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=0.80 (20% fixed demand)
R=0.0 R=0.2 R=0.4 R=0.6 R=0.8
Hour RSI(G3) RSI(G5) RSI(G3) RSI(G5) RSI(G3) RSI(G5) RSI(G3) RSI(G5) RSI(G3) RSI(G5)
00 1.12 1.03 1.40 1.29 1.87 1.72 2.81 2.58 5.61 5.17
01 1.22 1.12 1.52 1.40 2.03 1.87 3.04 2.80 6.08 5.60
02 1.29 1.19 1.61 1.48 2.15 1.98 3.22 2.96 6.44 5.93
03 1.33 1.22 1.66 1.53 2.21 2.04 3.32 3.05 6.63 6.11
04 1.37 1.26 1.71 1.57 2.28 2.10 3.42 3.15 6.84 6.30
05 1.35 1.24 1.68 1.55 2.25 2.07 3.37 3.10 6.73 6.20
06 1.33 1.22 1.66 1.53 2.21 2.04 3.32 3.05 6.63 6.11
07 1.25 1.15 1.56 1.44 2.08 1.92 3.13 2.88 6.25 5.76
08 1.09 1.01 1.37 1.26 1.82 1.68 2.74 2.52 5.47 5.04
09 0.99 0.92 1.24 1.15 1.66 1.53 2.49 2.29 4.97 4.58
10 0.97 0.90 1.22 1.12 1.62 1.49 2.43 2.24 4.86 4.48
11 0.96 0.89 1.20 1.11 1.60 1.48 2.41 2.21 4.81 4.43
12 0.97 0.90 1.22 1.12 1.62 1.49 2.43 2.24 4.86 4.48
13 0.99 0.92 1.24 1.15 1.66 1.53 2.49 2.29 4.97 4.58
14 1.01 0.93 1.26 1.16 1.68 1.54 2.52 2.32 5.03 4.63
15 1.01 0.93 1.26 1.16 1.68 1.54 2.52 2.32 5.03 4.63
16 0.96 0.89 1.20 1.11 1.60 1.48 2.41 2.21 4.81 4.43
17 0.88 0.81 1.09 1.01 1.46 1.34 2.19 2.02 4.38 4.03
18 0.91 0.84 1.14 1.05 1.52 1.40 2.28 2.10 4.56 4.20
19 0.92 0.85 1.15 1.06 1.54 1.41 2.30 2.12 4.61 4.24
20 0.93 0.86 1.16 1.07 1.55 1.43 2.33 2.14 4.66 4.29
21 0.95 0.88 1.19 1.10 1.59 1.46 2.38 2.19 4.76 4.38
22 1.01 0.93 1.26 1.16 1.68 1.54 2.52 2.32 5.03 4.63
23 1.08 0.99 1.35 1.24 1.80 1.66 2.70 2.49 5.40 4.98
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Table 2.6 Dynamic 5-Bus Test Case: Average Relative Market Advantage Index (RMAI)
results with standard deviations on successive days for the learning GenCos case as
R varies from R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand)
Day R = 0.0 R = 0.2 R = 0.4 R = 0.6 R = 0.8 R = 1.0
10 139.06 424.86 719.19 2,006.50 1,873.17 3,116.74
(416.49) (1,201.19) (2,449.79) (6,627.53) (6,308.01) (11,478.58)
50 276.60 697.52 1,524.85 3,443.01 2,649.94 3,707.51
(748.42) (2,112.42) (4,608.18) (10,471.74) (8,590.80) (11,909.11)
100 362.40 569.93 899.26 2,379.93 2,348.32 3,069.37
(829.61) (1,523.32) (2,724.74) (6,752.46) (6,817.43) (10,091.30)
1000 878.59 906.97 776.06 1,968.14 1,737.53 2,918.16
(1,513.36) (2,906.84) (2,657.66) (6,590.91) (6,389.19) (12,095.18)
Table 2.7 Dynamic 5-Bus Test Case: Average Market Advantage (MA) results with standard
deviations on successive days for the learning GenCos case as R varies from R=0.0
(100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand)GenCo MAI values
Day R = 0.0 R = 0.2 R = 0.4 R = 0.6 R = 0.8 R = 1.0
10 146,808.50 69,037.57 32,372.44 21,121.70 15,277.52 8,274.85
(296,766.02) (106,469.42) (48,622.70) (40,103.79) (27,527.92) (16,626.61)
50 175,500.45 69,575.46 43,939.71 27,184.67 16,558.95 7,717.03
(353,928.49) (88,212.41) (63,760.51) (45,737.52) (26,863.22) (15,060.39)
100 307,262.12 68,976.70 36,528.33 24,177.05 16,067.05 8,172.46
(556,696.68) (97,491.68) (59,562.84) (43,029.44) (27,086.31) (16,330.44)
1000 469,927.68 94,377.59 34,959.28 22,404.63 15,472.34 8,274.95
(1,513.36) (165,337.31) (59,932.77) (42,864.65) (27,334.08) (16,171.00)
Table 2.8 Dynamic 5-Bus Test Case: Average Adjusted Operational Efficiency Index (Ad-
jOEI) results with standard deviations on successive days for the learning GenCos
case as R varies from R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive
demand)
Day R = 0.0 R = 0.2 R = 0.4 R = 0.6 R = 0.8 R = 1.0
10 2.5045 2.1544 1.7395 1.2741 2.4764 0.6155
(1.3451) (1.0462) (0.6554) (0.1981) (1.2885) (0.2203)
50 2.9325 1.8717 1.5878 1.3599 2.8254 0.5936
(1.8837) (0.5695) (0.4312) (0.3191) (1.8416) (0.2677)
100 4.6678 1.8240 1.5484 1.2747 2.4697 0.6299
(2.4285) (0.9039) (0.5006) (0.2716) (1.5602) (0.2424)
1000 6.0972 2.6831 1.6238 1.2289 2.2098 0.6709
(1.1949) (1.8110) (0.7226) (0.2212) (1.2518) (0.2358)
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CHAPTER 3. Financial Risk Management in Electric Restructured Power
Markets: Literature Review
3.1 Introduction to Restructured Power Markets
This chapter presents a survey of work done by various researchers who investigate the risk
management issues of market participants. The first half of this chapter focuses on electric
power derivatives and their pricing, providing a concise review of various models developed to
predict/forecast spot prices. The second half discusses the use special financial instruments
calledFinancial Transmission Rights (FTRs) in dealing with price risks and the associated
issues of market efficiency.
The literature review/essay is organized as follows. In section 2, a brief review of the need for
hedging in deregulated power markets is presented. In section 3, a summary of characteristics
idiosyncratic to electric power markets is presented, followed by a review of various models
used by different researchers to price power derivatives. In section 4, a brief description of the
causes of congestion risk is presented followed by the definition of FTRs. In section 5, the risk
hedging function of FTRs is presented in some detail. Section 6 presents different ways that
market participants can avail to acquire FTRs. Section 7 presents criticism of the FTR auction
model as related to its hedging functionality. Section 8 presents a survey of research on market
power exacerbation due to FTRs, and also the implications of ISO’s FTR allocation policies on
the overall market efficiency. Section 9 presents a survey of research on transmission expansion
incentives provided by issuing of FTRs.
42
3.2 Electric Power Derivatives
Electric power is not a tradeable asset in the classical sense since storage costs are pro-
hibitively high. This is a very fundamental factor distinguishing electric power markets from
other markets. Hydro-electricity can be argued to provide “storable” electricity because of the
water held by a dam. However, only 6% of electricity production in the US comes from hydro-
electric power plants and hence, can be neglected. The non-storability feature of electricity
adds volatility to electric power spot prices because inventories cannot be used to smooth de-
mand or supply shocks. However, the absence of storage lends predictability to inter-temporal
variation in electric power prices, such as between daytime and nighttime.
The transmission constraints, as also the physics governing the functioning of underlying
power grid affect very much the geographical extent of the market. These constraints make
the transportation of electricity extremely uneconomical among certain regions. The electric
power contracts and prices thus become extremely localized, i.e. strongly dependent of local
demand and supply conditions.
Price spikes can appear abruptly and erratically in electric power markets. The price spikes
generally prevail for a very short time (hours), mostly due to sudden supply/demand shocks
and then return to “normal” levels. Electric power prices are believed by many to follow mean-
reverting process. However, even accounting for seasonal variation, price spikes can appear at
times due to generation and/or transmission line outages.
As a consequence, market for financial instruments has been created to allow the market
participants to hedge against price risks. The basic tradeable instruments in the electric power
markets are forward and futures contracts with delivery of electricity over a period of time.
The arbitrage opportunities across time and space, which are based on storability and trans-
portability are extremely limited, if not totally eliminated in electric power markets. Hence,
the relationship between spot and future electric power prices is not the same as for other
commodities. The issues mentioned above are idiosyncratic to electricity markets and magnify
the complexity of forecasting future spot prices or pricing of derivatives.
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3.3 Pricing of Electric Power Derivatives
3.3.1 Electricity versus Other Commodity Pricing
As explained by Eydeland and Geman (1998), the following problems occur in pricing elec-
tric power derivatives because of non-storability, which are not common to other commodities.
• The notion of convenience yield was introduced by the economists Kaldor and Working
to capture the benefit from owning a capacity minus the cost of storage. However, due to
prohibitively high storage costs the idea of convenience yield cannot be used in valuation
of electric power options.
• The no-arbitrage argument used to establish a relationship, which prevails at equilibrium,
between spot and future prices of stocks etc., breaks down in the case of electricity
markets. The no-arbitrage models rely on the asset to be bought (sold) at time t and
held until maturity T .
• Another consequence of non-storability is that the famous delta-hedging method cannot
be implemented in electricity markets as it entails holding commodity for a certain time.
3.3.2 Electricity Price Patterns
Various models developed by researchers to value electric power derivatives recognize the
following patterns in electricity prices. These patterns have been observed in all the deregulated
markets to varying degrees.
• Seasonality: It is a well established fact that electric energy consumption is the highest
during summer months.
• Mean Reversion: Electric power prices can typically be approximated by estimating pro-
duction costs. Unless a systematic market-wide increase in production costs occurs, the
electric power prices should hover around the respective production costs under normal
demand conditions. Hence, the prices should stabilize around average production costs
over time.
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• Small fluctuations around the mean due to intra-day difference in demand or weather
conditions. For example, there is a noticeable and consistent difference between daytime
and nighttime prices.
• Price spikes are observed rather frequently due to sudden demand or supply shocks.
However, these price increases are not permanent. The most famous example is that of
the US midwest in 1998 when spot prices jumped from about $30-40 per MWh to more
than $2000-4000 per MWh in a matter of hours. The reasons cited for the same include
shutting down of nuclear power plant in Ohio due to tornadoes. The prices returned to
somewhat normal level of about $200 per MWh in a couple of days.
Any attempt to reasonably value power derivatives must account for the above mentioned
trends, with mean reversibility and jumps being the most important factors.
3.3.3 Pricing Models
To price electricity derivatives, it is necessary to characterize the evolution of the price of
electricity through time. The pricing approaches generally fall into two classes of models: spot-
based models and forward-based models. Spot models are appealing since they tend to be quite
tractable and also allow for a good mathematical description of the problem in question. In
Eydeland and Geman (1998) the authors present a diffusion process with stochastic volatility,
which accounts for mean reversion, and the spot prices follow Brownian motion. The model
can be written as,
dS(t) = µ(St, t)dt+ σS(t)dWt (3.1)
where µ(St, t) is the mean reverting component and Wt is a Brownian motion. The term σ is
a constant. Significant contributions have been made by Schwartz (1997), who introduces an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type of model, which accounts for the mean reversion of prices. In Lucia
and Schwartz (2002) the authors extend the model to a two-factor model, which incorporates
a deterministic seasonal component as well. The class of diffusion models, as noted by Barlow
(2002), do not give rise to price spikes as noticed in California or Alberta markets.
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Geman (1994) notes, “Since extreme temperatures, and hence, an extreme power demand,
happen to coincide with outages in power generation and/or transmission, the dynamics of
electricity spot prices can be advantageously represented by a jump-diffusion process.” In a
jump diffusion model, price change can be divided into the following: (1) A continuous price
diffusion process modeled by Geometric Brownian Motion with mean reversion and a volatility
term structure. This component captures the electric power price dynamics without spikes
(as detailed before), and (2) A discontinuous jump process modeled by a Poisson distribution,
which might be a result of outages, transmission constraints, etc. Eydeland and Geman (1998)
present a simple representation of a jump-diffusion process written as follows.
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt + UStdNt (3.2)
where the diffusion component is represented by a Poisson process (Nt) with a random magni-
tude. U is a real valued random variable representing the sign and magnitude of the jump. The
model so described is the same as Merton’s jump diffusion model, which assumes independence
between the two components. The assumption though, is not a fair one in electricity markets,
for example, prices are highly unlikely to spike at nighttime with low levels of demand.
Geman and Roncoroni (2006) follow similar process modeling spikes via jump process and
are able to successfully fit spot prices collected from several markets. Cartea and Figueroa
(2005) present a model that captures mean reversion, jumps and seasonality while calibrating
the parameters to the England and Wales market. Barlow (2002) presents a model of pure
diffusion model for spot electric power prices, which exhibit spikes. The model starts from a
simple demand and supply model for electricity and uses nonlinear Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type of
mean-reverting process. The model, however, is stationary and does not provide a satisfactory
relationship between spot and futures prices.
Routledge et al. (1999) consider equilibrium model of electricity contracts. They focus on
linkage between natural gas and electricity markets (spark spread) because natural gas can be
stored and converted into electricity.
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3.3.4 Risk Premium
Financial markets have typically been established to facilitate the transfer of risk, where
forward premium represents the compensation required, in equilibrium, by those willing to
bear the risk. Given that spikes are relatively more frequent in electricity markets compared to
other commodities, electric power forward prices must contain risk premium. Empirical work
done by Pirrong and Jermakyan (2000) provides evidence of existence of risk premia (seasonal)
in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland (PJM) markets.
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) argue that the arbitrage argument, which can be made
for other commodities, does not hold for pricing electric power derivatives. The well known
cost-of-carry relationship linking spot and forward prices cannot be applied because electricity
cannot be stored (economically) to be later sold at forward price. Hence the cost of carry
approach needs to be reformulated as done by Geman:
ForwardPrice = SpotPrice+ pi(t, T ) (3.3)
where risk premium is represented by pi(t, T ) and depends on time to maturity of the forward
contract. Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) present an equilibrium model implying that for-
ward power price is downward biased predictor of the future spot price if the expected power
demand is low and demand risk is moderate. The forward premium increases when the ex-
pected demand or demand variance is high. They present some empirical evidence of the same
for forward prices during summer months in PJM market. Longstaff and Wang (2004) also
point out the existence of very high risk premiums paid in PJM electricity forward markets to
compensate the sellers for extreme shocks.
3.4 Financial Risk Management in Wholesale Power Markets
Based on Yu et al. (2010) we present a scenario that considers the short-term risk-management
problems faced by a GenCo operating in a wholesale power market with congestion managed
by LMP (see Hogan (1992b), Litvinov et al. (2004),Finney et al. (1997),Wu et al. (2005),Cheng
and Overbye (2006),Chen et al. (2002),Conejo et al. (2005)). Consider the 5-bus scenario de-
picted in Fig. 3.1. In this scenario a particular GenCo owns a nuclear power plant, G3, located
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Figure 3.1 Illustrative risk management problem for a GenCo operating in a 5-bus wholesale
power market under LMP.
at bus 3, and a coal-fired power plant, G4, located at bus 4. Other generation plants G1, G2,
and G5 are located at buses 1 and 5. There are also three LSEs 1, 2, and 3 located at buses 2,
3, and 4 whose demand for power in each hour is assumed to be fixed, i.e., not sensitive to price
changes. Each transmission line has an associated thermal limit (not indicated in the figure).
Suppose that the GenCo is required each day to report a 24-hour supply offer to the day-
ahead energy market for its coal-fired power plant, and it does this by reporting strategically
in an attempt to secure for itself the highest possible net earnings. That is, for its coal-fired
plant the GenCo can report higher-than-true marginal costs of production or less-than-true
maximum operating capacity. On the other hand, suppose the GenCo’s daily 24-hour supply
of nuclear power is externally determined in accordance with safety regulations.
Given all supply offers for all generation plants and total LSE load for any given hour H
of the day-ahead energy market, the ISO solves a standard DC optimal power flow (DC OPF)
optimization problem that involves the minimization of (reported) generation production costs
subject to network constraints, (reported) generation operating capacity limits, and a balancing
condition requiring that the total supply of power just equal total load. The solution of this
problem determines for hour H the GenCo’s dispatch levels for nuclear power at bus 3 and coal-
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fired power at bus 4, as well as dispatch levels for all other generation plants and a Locational
Marginal Price (LMP) in $/MWh at each bus. Given congestion anywhere on the 5-bus grid
in a particular hour, the LMP solutions determined via DC OPF for this hour will “separate,”
meaning that the LMPs at two or more buses will deviate from each other. The price received
by the GenCo for its dispatched supply of nuclear power at bus 3 is the LMP at bus 3, and the
price received by the GenCo for its dispatched supply of coal-fired power at bus 4 is the LMP
at bus 4.
Clearly drops in the LMP value at either bus 3 or bus 4 result in lower net earnings for
the GenCo, all else equal. Moreover, lower LMP values over time result in lower net earnings
for the GenCo, all else equal. Finally, increases in the GenCo’s fuel input costs lower its net
earnings, all else equal. Hereafter the possibility that the GenCo receives lower net earnings
due to adverse price movements, either output or input, will be called the GenCo’s price risk .
The GenCo can attempt to manage its price risk by engaging in physical or financial bilateral
transactions1 with other market participants. For example, the GenCo could write a contract
C with an LSE j on day D specifying that the GenCo will inject q MWs of power at bus 3
and/or bus 4 during a specific hour H of day D+1 for a specific strike price p ($/MWh), and
the LSE j will in turn withdraw power q at its bus location during hour H of day D+1 and
pay to the GenCo the strike price p.
However, this bilateral contracting is complicated by the fact that injections and with-
drawals of power on the transmission grid are in fact charged in accordance with LMP. To
ensure the strike price p can be implemented in hour H of day D+1 under LMP, the bilateral
contract C needs to incorporate an appropriate contract-for-difference (CFD) clause ensuring
the effective price is p even if the LMP received by GenCo i or paid by LSE j differs from
p. Further, given the possibility of LMP separation across buses, “making whole” the strike
price p in hour H of day D+1 also requires additional contracts, such as Financial Transmis-
sion Rights (FTRs) associated with pairs of buses k and m. Roughly stated (ignoring network
1In U.S. ISO-managed energy regions such as (MISO, , p. 15), a bilateral transaction that involves the physical
transfer of energy through a transmission provider’s region is referred to as a physical bilateral transaction.
Bilateral transactions that only transfer financial responsibility within and across a transmission provider’s
region are referred to as financial bilateral transactions.
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losses), a 1-MW FTR from a bus k to a bus m in hour H of day D+1 is a financial contract that
entitles its holder to receive (or pay) compensation ($/h) in amount 1-MW × [LMPm−LMPk]
for hour H of day D+1.
An appropriate combination of an FTR contract and a CFD-extended version of the bilateral
contract C can ensure that the GenCo receives the strike price p for its injection of q MWs in
hour H of day D+1, thus reducing its price risk. However, this reduction in price risk needs
to be balanced against the cost of acquiring the supporting contracts.
In summary, for the scenario at hand, at any given time the GenCo’s asset portfolio will
include physical assets (power plants G3 and G4), a futures contract (cleared supply offer) for
sales in the day-ahead energy market, and various forms of bilateral contracts and FTRs.
3.5 Risk-Hedging Through Bilateral and FTR Contracts
Consider a GenCo i and an LSE j that are participants in an ISO-managed day-ahead
energy market with locational marginal pricing. GenCo i receives a price LMPi for each MW
of power it injects at its bus i, and LSE j pays a price LMPj for each MW of power that its
retail customers withdraw at bus location j, where these LMP values are determined by the
ISO through an appropriate OPF calculation.
Suppose GenCo i wishes to use bilateral contracts to manage its (output) price risk. In
particular, suppose GenCo i enters into a contract C with LSE j on day D specifying that
GenCo i will inject q MWs of power at bus i during a specific hour H of day D+1 for a specific
strike price p ($/MWh). In turn, the contract C obliges LSE j to purchase q MWs of power
at bus location j during hour H of day D+1 and to pay to GenCo i the strike price p for each
MW of this withdrawn power.
As noted in Section, the implementation of this bilateral contract is complicated by the fact
that power injected into or withdrawn from the transmission network is priced by means of
LMPs. Consider, first, the case in which there is no network congestion during the designated
hour H. In this case all bus LMPs for hour H collapse to a single value, say LMP∗. If LMP∗
differs from the contract strike price p, Genco i and LSE j will need to extend their original
bilateral contract C to a contract C∗ incorporating a CFD clause stipulating that either party
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will be compensated by the other for excessive or insufficient payment in relation to the intended
strike price p.
For example, suppose LMP∗ > p, implying that LSE j pays more than the strike price
p for the power its retail customers withdraw at bus j and GenCo i receives more than the
strike price p for the power it injects at bus i. The CFD clause should then require GenCo i to
compensate LSE j with an extra payment q·[LMP∗ - p], thus “making whole” LSE j by ensuring
the effective price paid for the contracted power amount q is the strike price p. Similarly, in
the reverse case p > LMP∗, the CFD clause should require LSE j to “make whole” GenCo i
with an extra payment q·[p - LMP∗].
Hence, in the absence of congestion, the extended contract C∗ provides a perfect hedge for
GenCo i and LSE j against price risk in the form of deviations of LMP∗ from p. If network
congestion arises in hour H, however, C∗ will not be enough to ensure a complete hedging
against this price risk. Congestion can lead to divergence between the LMPi at bus i received
by GenCo i and the LMPj at bus j paid by LSE j. In particular, the LMPi at bus i could
drop below p while at the same time the LMPj at bus j exceeds p, implying that both parties
to the contract are in need of “make whole” payments.
This gap in hedge coverage can be filled by an appropriate parallel purchase of FTRs in
the form of obligations, the only form of FTR to be considered below. An FTR in the form
of an obligation entitles its holder to compensation (or obliges its holder to pay) based on the
difference in LMP outcomes between two specified bus locations for some specified hour.2 For
example, suppose a market participant holds an FTR position of q MWs for a source bus i and
a sink bus j for a particular hour H. The holder is then entitled to receive a compensation of
piij = q · [LMPj − LMPi] ($/h) (3.4)
from the ISO if piij ≥ 0; otherwise the holder must pay the ISO the amount −piij . Since bus
LMPs collapse to a single value across the transmission network in the absence of congestion
(ignoring typically small network losses), FTR compensations and payments only take place in
2More precisely, if network losses are considered, these compensations or payment obligations are based on
the congestion components of LMPs rather than the LMP values per se. This complication is ignored in this
introductory presentation.
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congested conditions.
How might GenCo i and LSE j accomplish a complete hedge of their price risk through
a combined holding of an appropriate CFD-extended bilateral contract and an FTR holding?
Suppose GenCo i acquires an FTR position of q MWs from bus i to bus j on day D for hour
H of the day-ahead energy market on day D+1. GenCo i’s net receipts on day D+1 from its
energy injection and its FTR holding are then as follows:
q · LMPi + q · [LMPj − LMPi] = q · LMPj . (3.5)
Consequently, under the FTR, GenCo i’s sale price in hour H of day D+1 has been effectively
changed from LMPi to LMPj , the purchase price paid by LSEj at bus j in hour H of day
D+1. Suppose, in addition, that GenCo i and LSEj extend their bilateral contract C with the
following type of CFD clause applying only to bus j: GenCo i makes a payment to LSE j in
amount q · [LMPj − p] if LMPj > p or receives a payment from LSE j in amount q · [p−LMPj ]
if p > LMPj . This combination of contracts ensures that the price received by GenCo i and
paid by LSE j for the contracted power level q in hour H of day D+1 is precisely p.
3.6 FTR Acquisition Process
A Financial Transmission Rights contract has the following specifications for GenCo i lo-
cated at bus i:
• Source Bus i and Sink Bus j
• Max Bid Price: ρij $/MWh
• Max Bid Amount: FTRMaxij MW
FTRs can be acquired by market participants in the following ways:
3.6.1 FTR Auction
The annual FTR auction is conducted by ISO to sell FTR quantities equivalent to a part of
the total available transmission capacity. Subsequent auctions are held every month in which
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FTR quantities equivalent to residual (after annual auction) transmission capacity are available
to be sold. FTRs held by market participants (acquired during annual auction) can be entered
into monthly auction as offers to sell. In PJM (2009) 50% of the total transmission capacity
is available to be sold in the annual FTR auction. About 95% of the remaining 50% of the
transmission capacity can then be sold in the subsequent monthly auctions. The auctions are
generally held in multiple rounds where the FTRs bought in previous rounds can be entered
as offers to sell in the current or subsequent rounds of auction.
3.6.2 FTR Secondary Market
Upon completion of the annual and monthly auctions, the market participants are allowed to
buy/sell FTRs without entering into the monthly auctions. However, FTRs are point-to-point
transmission contracts and because of the numerous combinations of pairs over which FTRs
can be written, the liquidity of FTR trading over any given pair of grid buses is generally
limited. To maintain the simultaneous feasibility of allocated FTRs, the ISOs impose following
restrictions on the trading of FTRs in the secondary markets:
• FTR quantity and/or date can be reconfigured in case of change in ownership of Bilateral
Contracts. However, such reconfiguration only entails transfer of rights and are approved
only after credit worthiness of market participants is evidenced. The FTR cannot be
reconfigured with respect to FTR receipt and withdrawal points.
• Any given FTR may be split into multiple FTRs, however, the receipt and withdrawal
points cannot be altered compared to the original FTR. Additionally, the aggregate of
the reconfigured FTRs must equal the original FTR in all respects.
• The dates specified in the reconfigured FTRs must not span less than 1 day.
3.6.3 Grand-fathered FTRs
ISOs allot a certain number of FTRs to be handed out for “free” to market participants
based on historical firm-transmission3 usage as well as for qualified transmission investments.
3Firm transmission is roughly defined as the actual transmission capacity minus the reservation capacity.
The amount of firm-transmission is calculated differently by various ISOs.
53
The latter is generally thought to provide incentive for transmission investment. The FTRs
allotted under this scheme are allowed to be sold through FTR auction or the secondary market.
Unlike the FTR auction, allocation of FTRs is not based on market driven mechanism and can
be done in the following ways:
Direct Allocation: In this method the ISOs allocate FTRs free of cost to the market par-
ticipants. The rules for direct allocation of FTRs differ among various ISOs. The ISOs must
ensure that the issued FTRs always satisfy the SFT. The effect of FTR allocation to either the
generating companies or the load serving entities (LSEs) has a direct bearing on the level of
market efficiency (will be discussed later).
Auction Revenue Rights: Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs) are financial instruments that
entail their holders a share of proceeds from the annual FTR auction. ARRs, like the direct
allocation method, are allocated to market participants on the basis of historical firm trans-
mission usage. The firm historic usage of transmission system is determined differently by the
ISOs. ARRs are specified in the same way as the FTRs and are settled based on the clearing
prices from the annual FTR auction prices. ARRs can be of either obligation or option type.
ARR obligations, just like FTR obligations, may entail their holders to benefits or liabilities,
depending on the FTR auction outcome. In case of multi-round FTR auctions, the ARRs are
settled using the average of annual FTR auction prices calculated in the different rounds. The
ISOs must ensure the simultaneous feasibility of the allocated ARRs (just like FTRs).
The revenue from ARRs can be used by a market participant to buy any of the available
FTRs and not just the FTRs specified along the same path as the ARRs. ARRs are thus,
thought to be a better alternative to the direct allocation process.
3.7 Pricing of Transmission Congestion Derivatives and Partial Risk
Hedging
Siddiqui et al. (2003), using data from 2000 and 2001, show that the transmission congestion
constraints (TCCs) in New York provide an effective hedge against uncertain prices. However,
the prices paid for TCCs do no reflect congestion rents for large exposure hedges and over
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large distances. The authors present two possible reasons for the market inefficiency causing
customers to pay unreasonably high risk premiums. The first being low liquidity in TCC
markets and the second being the relaxing of the requirement that the possible number of
TCCs being equal to the actual energy flows.
Deng et al. (2005) present theoretical evidence for empirical findings that the clearing prices
of FTRs, resulting from centralized auctions, significantly and systematically differ from the
congestion revenue payoffs for holding those FTRs for the market participants. The authors
first describe the mathematical optimization problem used by ISOs to issue FTRs to market
participants.
maxqij
∑
i,j∈m
∑
j 6=i
fij · qij
s.t.qi =
∑
j 6=i
qij −
∑
k 6=i
qki∀i ∈ m
−L ≤ Gr ·Q ≤ L∀r ∈ R
0 ≤ qij ≤ qij∀i, j, andj 6= i (3.6)
where qij ,∀i, j denote the FTR quantities from node i to j, and Q ≡ (q1, q2, ...., qm)T denote the
energy injection/withdrawal vector at the respective buses, imputed from all awarded FTRs.
Let C ≡ (c1, c2, ...., cm)T denote the vector of expected LMPs at the m nodes, then fij ≡ cj−ci.
L is the vector of transmission line capacity limits and Gr is the power transfer distribution
factor (PTDF) matrix for each contingency r ∈ R. The aggregate quantity of FTR awarded
from node i to j is bounded above by qij . Thus the objective is to maximize the auction value
subject to nodal energy balance, transmission capacity and maximum possible FTR award
constraints, respectively.
The authors show that even in presence of perfect foresight of payoff from holding FTRs
(which entails bidding for FTRs at price equal to the expected present value of future congestion
revenue payoff for a rational risk neutral participant), the clearing prices depend significantly
on the amount of bid quantities. In particular, the limits on the FTRs quantities available to
be purchased by market participants result in market clearing prices significantly different from
bid prices. The authors use assumption of risk neutral participants, bidding FTR quantities at
price equal to present value of expected future payoff, to construct a “virtual” energy auction
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from the original annual FTR auction conducted by the ISO. Using simulations for a five-node
grid, the authors run economic dispatch problem to obtain values for, Pi-, the ex-post nodal
LMPs and Q - the vector of power dispatch level each generating unit. The quantity bid in
the “virtual” energy auction (FTR auction) is then bounded above and below by αQ and −αQ
respectively, and the bid price equals present value of expected future payoff. When α = 1, the
bid quantity in virtual energy auction equals the generator quantity amounts from economic
dispatch problem and the payoff from holding FTRs matches exactly the market clearing prices.
Hence, the generators are completely hedged against congestion risk. However, when α 6= 1, the
payoffs from holding FTRs significantly differ from market clearing prices and the generators
are exposed to some price risk.
The result although trivial, shows a glaring problem with ISO’s conduct of FTR auctions.
It is a common practice by ISO’s to limit the number of FTRs available in annual auctions to
about 50% (α = .5) of the total transmission capacity. Hence, the generators cannot completely
hedge against congestion risk and are exposed to significant financial risks because of the market
design itself. About 95% of remaining transmission capacity is available to be purchased during
subsequent monthly auctions. Whether the monthly auctions eliminate completely or partially
the financial risks from congestion remains to be further analyzed.
Locational vs Zonal Pricing : In Benjamin (2010), Benjamin examines the risk-hedging
properties of FTRs in markets where load is settled on a zonal level (such as PJM), rather than
nodal level (MISO,NYISO,ISO-NE). In zonal pricing paradigm, where market participants
pay/receive load weighted prices in a defined zone, the author shows, using a three-bus grid,
that some market participants (depending on the location in the grid) may be over/under
hedged against the price risks due to congestion.
3.8 FTRs and Market Power
Strategic behavior of FTR holders has been analyzed by various researchers. Joskow and
Tirole (2000) study the effect of FTRs on market power of generators (GenCos). They con-
clude that for a specific configuration of GenCos (expensive monopolist at South node and
price taking competitive GenCos at North node in a 2-node system) holding of FTRs by the
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monopolist increases its market power. They also analyze different configurations of three-node
networks and reach the same conclusion of market inefficiency caused by holding of FTRs. The
claim was further established by Oren (1997) who shows that even in the absence of market
concentration, expectation of congestion and passive transmission rights can lead to implicit
collusion between generators and hence, market inefficiency. Stoft (1999), re-investigates Oren
(1997) using Cournot competition based analysis to show that financial transmission rights
such as TCCs can curb market power. Stoft points out that Oren’s second example , which
is intended to be a Cournot model, is mistakenly constructed as a Bertrand model and hence,
is mis-analyzed. However, Stoft’s analysis is based on long-term profits of strategic generators
and not on the actual effect on prices (above marginal cost) that defines market power. Hogan
Hogan (2000), using a slightly modified version of the grid used by Joskow et al, shows that
use of FTRs does in fact increase social welfare. Sun (2005) shows that in the presence of
stochastic parameter shocks, and absence of market power, acquisition of FTRs by risk averse
market participants increases the social welfare compared with the case where there is no FTR
available.
Unlike Physical Transmission Rights, FTRs cannot be used to withold transmission ca-
pacity. However, by strategic bidding in the day-ahead market, an FTR owner may be able
to increase congestion level in the transmission grid to earn higher payoff. The situation is
presented by Bushnell (1999) and shows that although, this kind of strategic activity may not
be indicative of market power abuse, but can deem lower efficiency levels compared to no FTR
case.
3.8.1 Impacts of Allocation of FTRs on Market Efficiency
Allocation of FTRs to the market participants has a direct bearing on market efficiency.
Joskow and Tirole (2000) conclude that when the FTRs are allocated to a market participant
that is neither a generator nor a load, the monopoly generator will want to acquire all the FTRs.
When the FTRs are allocated to a market participant with no market power, the monopoly
generator will buy no FTRs and when the FTRs are auctioned to the highest bidders, the
generators will buy a random number of FTRs.
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As shown by various researchers, FTRs provide incentives for GenCos to act strategically
in order to increase their net-earnings. The FTRs can thus counter-act to the benefits of price
risk hedging. In order to curb the potential of market power induced by FTRs, Bautista et al.
(2004) proposed that the FTRs should be issued from- or to- a common point, determined by
a measure called relative cross-price sensitivity. However, by effectively reducing the number
of FTRs, it is not clear how the proposed approach will interfere with the price-risk hedging
function of FTRs.
Benjamin (2010) examines the hedging and re-distributional properties of FTRs. Specifi-
cally, using two-bus and three-bus grids, the author shows how different allocation methods of
FTRs have an impact on the distribution of congestion rent and the related implications for
retail rates. It is shown that if the FTRs are allocated to LSEs (who are required to credit
FTR revenues against electricity procurement costs), then in theory the retail customers can
reap benefits of lower energy prices.
3.9 FTRs and Transmission Investment
The efficient functioning of electricity markets necessitates sufficient transmission capacity.
Investment in transmission ensures that power consumed is generated using cheaper and/or
alternative4 sources of energy. Congestion on a grid, as indicated by separation of locational
prices (although prices can differ for reasons other that congestion due to insufficient trans-
mission capacity) leads to generation of power out-of-merit order and hence, reduced social
surplus. The short-run congestion cost to society can be calculated as the difference in location
prices times the energy transferred between two buses.
Investments in transmission capacities can be undertaken by centrally planned government
regulations like in UK and Norwak (see Woolf and Hunt) or through private enterprize. The lat-
ter approach requires provisioning of sufficient financial incentives facilitated by market mech-
anisms. A mixture of regulatory mechanism and merchant incentives is used for transmission
investment in US and Australia.
The issuance of long-term or incremental FTRs (IFTRs) is considered to provide market
4Such as wind energy produced in the Dakotas.
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based incentives for transmission investment, since the receivers of IFTRs receive payoffs that
are determined using market based energy auctions. Under this design, additional FTRs are
issued to market participants that invest in new transmission capacity. Currently, IFTRs
are issued by CAISO, MISO and NYISO, while PJM and ISO-NE offer incremental ARRs.
Bushnell and Stoft prove that the net value of IFTRs allocated under feasibility rules of existing
transmission capacity, will not exceed the increase in social welfare. Also, if a transmission
expansion causes reduction in social welfare, then the market participant holds IFTRs with
negative value. Using a two-bus grid where a new transmission line is added, they show the
negative impact on the payoff of existing FTRs, and propose that the investor be accountable
for the negative externalities due to its transmission investment.
However, there are some difficulties in using this approach to incentivize transmission in-
vestment. The first problem is that the issued set of IFTRs, along with a base set of FTRs,
must be simultaneously feasible over the existing transmission network. The base FTRs are
issued periodically, i.e., yearly and monthly, are of shorter maturity periods. However, the
IFTRs can have much longer maturity periods. Secondly, additional transmission investment
over the years might mitigate LMP differentials over some paths of IFTRs and thus dilute the
payoffs from holding those IFTRs. The investors must therefore, be aware and willing to take
such risks.
As pointed out by Joskow and Tirole (2003), exerting of market power by some market
participants can provide inaccurate estimation of benefits from transmission investment. Using
a two-bus grid, they show that under a certain market setup, exerting of market power by a
GenCo leads to over-reporting of congestion cost and hence, over-estimation of the benefits to
be had from transmisson investment. For another market setup, they also present the alternate
example of under-estimation for benefits from transmission investment.
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CHAPTER 4. Study of Joint Bidding Strategies in Physical and Financial
Electric Power Markets Using Analytical and Agent-Based Models
4.1 Introduction
Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) are in use in most of the US (restructured) wholesale
electric power markets. FTRs were designed to provide market participants a financial tool
that could be used to hedge against price volatility, due to congestion risks, in the Day-Ahead
energy market (DAM) settlements. Fig. 4.1 shows a rough time-line of the operation of FTR
auction and the day-ahead markets operated by the grid operator.
GenCos submit 
offers to supply 
energy in real-
time market the 
following day 
GenCos acquire 
FTRs to hedge 
against future 
price risk 
FTR – 
Auction:  
Day – Ahead 
Energy Market 
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bidders 
Energy 
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Payoff from 
FTRs portfolio 
based on 
energy 
market 
settlements 
Figure 4.1 Rough time-line of restructured wholesale power markets
The payoff for holding an FTR from node k to m depends on the locational marginal price
(LMP) differential between the two nodes in the said direction. The prices that energy traders
are willing to pay to acquire FTR portfolios in the ISO FTR auctions will thus presumably
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reflect their expectations with regard to payoffs in the DAM. On the other hand, after acquiring
FTR portfolios, market participants can report strategic supply offers to the ISO in the day-
ahead energy markets in an attempt to influence the LMP outcomes, upon which their FTR
payments depend. The two problems have been studied by various researchers1, although in
isolation i.e., in a partial-equilibrium like setup. Bidding in the FTR auction market is studied
by taking as given the expected outcomes in the DA energy market, while the supply offer
strategies in the DA energy market are modeled by assuming that a portfolio of FTRs has
already been acquired. In essence, a feedback mechanism linking the bidding strategies in
the two markets is yet to be studied extensively. We use a combination of analytical, and
computational agent-based models to study this problem.
The original contribution of this paper is to develop a feedback mechanism between the
two markets and to demonstrate the existence (or not) of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in
the “bidding” strategies of market participants in the FTR auction, with respect to their
expectations of energy market payoffs, as well as the expectations of their rivals’ “bidding”
strategies in the two markets. A theoretical framework is first developed to establish the
dynamics between the two markets and then, a three-bus grid is used to analytically study the
dependence of “bidding” strategies in the two markets. A key finding of this research is that
the supply-offer “bidding” behavior of market participants in the energy market is affected by
the portfolios of FTRs they hold. In particular, we find the existence of pure-strategy Nash
equilibria in supply offer “bidding” in the energy markets for only certain portfolios of FTRs.
We then use an agent-based computational model to study the dependence of bidding
strategies of participants in the two markets. The market participants are modeled as adaptive
learners that interact with other participants repeatedly in both the markets. We show that
the market participants are able to systematically coordinate their bidding strategies in the
two markets. In reporting the jointly-optimal bidding strategies the market participants are
also able to identify any spatial advantages they might have. The organization of this chapter
is as follows: In section 2, theoretical framework is developed to study the dynamics between
1The effects of FTRs on market power exercised by GenCos in DA energy market and overall market efficiency
have been studied in Joskow and Tirole (2000), Oren (1997), Stoft (1999), Hogan (2000), Sun (2005)
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the two markets. In section 4, a three-bus grid is used to analytically study the dependence
of bidding strategies in the two markets. In section 5, we present an agent-based model to
study the joint-bidding strategies of market participants in the two markets. Section 6 presents
concluding remarks.
4.2 Dependence of GenCo Bidding Strategy in Day Ahead Market and
FTR Auction
In this section an analytical framework is developed to examine the feedback mechanism
that link the bidding strategies in two markets. In particular, the bid strategies of the GenCos
in the FTR auction are conditioned on their expectations of DAM payoffs as well as on their
expectations of rivals’ strategies in the two markets. The dynamic choice problem for the
GenCos is modeled analytically as a three stage process. In stage 1, day D = 0, the GenCos
submit bids to acquire FTRs from the ISO’s FTR auction. In stage 2, day D > 0, the GenCos
report supply offers to the ISO for the DAM for dispatch for power production on day D+1.
On day D+1, the GenCos receive (or are liable to pay) compensation for the FTRs acquired
on day D = 0 based on the LMP outcomes for day D+1. The GenCo bidding strategies for
both markets are modeled as two-level optimization problems as presented in Fig. 4.
• Stage 2: In the first level of the two-level problem, the ISO solves an Optimal Power Flow
(OPF) problem, while taking as given the supply offers by different GenCos. In the second
level, the GenCos optimize supply function parameters bi for i = 1, ...I to maximize profits
from selling power as well as payoffs from holding a portfolio of FTRs Fi acquired on day
D-1, while taking as given the dispatch quantities pGi and nodal prices LMPki determined
in the first level by the ISO. Here, Ri is the vector of LMP differentials for portfolio of
FTRs held by GenCos. It is assumed that the ISO’s OPF solution process is transparent
to each player. The supply function equilibrium problem yields best response functions
bri for each GenCo. In case, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (or a set of equilibria), the
optimal strategies can be obtained by simultaneously solving the best response functions.
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• Stage 1: In the first level of the two-level problem, the ISO maximizes FTR auction
revenue subject to Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT), which ensures that the allotted
FTRs are feasible given then transmission constraints and contingency events. The ISO
optimization problem (if solution exists) yields FTR clearing prices FCPi and the allotted
FTRs Fi (a pair of vectors for each GenCo i). In the second level, the GenCos bid
strategically a pair of vectors (F bi , ρi) that represent the maximum amounts of desired
FTRs and the maximum willingness to pay for each FTR, respectively, to maximize the
utility from owning FTRs. The value function derived by solving day D problem first is
assumed to be known to each GenCo.
4.2.1 Model Basics
Table 4.1 Admissible Exogenous Variables And Functional Forms
Variable Description Admissibility Restrictions
K Total number of transmission grid buses K > 0
N Total number of physically distinct network branches N > 0
J Total number of LSEs J > 0
I Total number of GenCos I > 0
Jk Set of LSEs located at bus k Card(∪Kk=1 Jk) = J
Ik Set of GenCos located at bus k Card(∪Kk=1 Ik) = I
km Branch connecting buses k and m (if one exists) k 6= m
BR Set of all physically distinct branches km, k < m BR 6= ∅
xkm Reactance (ohm) for branch km xkm = xmk > 0, km ∈ BR
PUkm Thermal limit (MW) for real power flow on km P
U
km > 0, km ∈ BR
cj ,dj Demand coefficients ($/MW,$/MW
2) for LSEj cj ,dj > 0
CapLi Lower real power operating capacity limit (MW) for GenCoi Cap
L
i ≥ 0
CapUi Upper real power operating capacity limit (MW) for GenCoi Cap
U
i ≥ 0
a0i ,b
0
i True cost coefficients ($/MW,$/MW
2) for GenCoi b
0
i > 0
MCi(p) MCi(p) = a
0
i+2b
0
ip = GenCois true MC function for real power p MCi(Cap
L
i ) > 0
FCi,basekm Base case FTR on path km held by GenCo i FC
i,base
km = 0
Table 4.2 Endogenous Variables
Variable Description
bi Cost coefficient ($/MW
2) reported by GenCoi i=1,...,I
pGi Real-power generation (MW) supplied by GenCoi i=1,...,I
Pkm Real power (MW) flowing in branch km ∈ BR
LMPk Locational marginal price ($/MW) at bus k=1,...,K
FCPkm FTR clearing price for branch km ∈ BR
Fikm Fkm (MW) cleared in ISO FTR-auction for branch km to GenCoi
Fi FTR portfolio cleared in ISO FTR-auction to GenCoi for ∀km ∈ BR
Fibkm Fkm (MW) bid by GenCoi - Max amount of Fkm GenCo willing to buy
Fbi Vector of Fkm ∀km ∈ BR bid (to buy) by GenCoi
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We use a linear inverse demand function for electricity demand given by:
Dj(pLj) = cj − 2dj · pLj j =1,2,...J (4.1)
where pLj is the amount of load demanded by a Load Serving Entitiy (LSE) j, while cj and dj
are positive demand function coefficients. Each GenCo has a quadratic cost function given by:
Ci(pGi) = a
0
i · pGi + b0i · p2Gi i = 1,2,...I (4.2)
where a0i and b
0
i are non-negative true cost function coefficients. Thus, the supply offer
(marginal cost function) submitted by the GenCos to the ISO takes a linear form given by:
MCi(pGi) = ai + 2bi · pGi i = 1,2,...I (4.3)
where ai and bi represent reported marginal cost function coefficients and hence, the marginal
cost function reported by a GenCo to the ISO may differ from the true marginal cost. Next
we describe the DC-Optimal Power Flow (DC-OPF) solved by ISO to determine the dispatch
schedule of power generators.
4.2.2 ISO Day-Ahead Market Optimal Power Flow Problem
A commonly used representation for a DC-OPF problem is to minimize total net costs
corresponding to (TNC) subject to various transmission constraints. As explained at length in
Sun and Tesfation (2007) the DC-OPF problem formulation is as follows, where all endogenous
and exogenous variables are defined as in Tables ( 4.2) and ( ??), respectively:
min
pGi,pLj ,δk
J∑
j=1
(cj · pLj − dj · p2Lj)−
I∑
i=1
(ai · pGi + bi · p2Gi) + pi
[ ∑
km∈BR
[δk − δm]2
]
(4.4)
subject to:∑
i∈Ik
pGi −
∑
i∈Jk
pLj −
∑
km∈BR
Pkm = 0; ∀ nodes k,m = 1, ...,K (4.5)
Pkm = Bkm[δk − δm] (4.6)
|Pkm| ≤ PUkm (4.7)
CapLi ≤ pGi ≤ CapUi (4.8)
δ1 = 0 (4.9)
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where, (5) represents the nodal real power balance constraint. Real power thermal constraint
for each branch km ∈ BR are represented in (7), constraints (8) are the real power operating
capacity constraints for each GenCo i = 1, ...., I.
The dispatch schedule (if a solution exists for the optimization problem) for each GenCo
is determined as the primal variable of the optimization problem. Specifically, the LMPs are
determined as functions of GenCo reported cost function parameters, apart from the exogenous
variables that define transmission grid constraints.
pGi(a,b) = ϕGi(ai,a−i, bi,b−i) ∀ GenCos i = 1, ..., I (4.10)
The shadow prices (dual variables of OPF solution) associated with these constraints are the
LMPs for the corresponding nodes. Just like the dispatch quantities, the LMPs are determined
as functions of the GenCo reported cost function parameters:
LMPk(a,b) = φk(ai,a−i, bi,b−i) ∀ buses k = 1, ...,K (4.11)
4.2.3 GenCo Day-Ahead Market Supply Choice Problem
Now we briefly describe a GenCo’s decision making process. Upon observing ISO’s OPF
solution, the GenCos optimize the supply function slope to maximize profits, which includes
the payoff from holding the portfolio of FTRs acquired earlier.
max
bi
[[
LMPk(i)(a,b) ∗ pGi(a,b)− Ci (pGi(a,b))
]
+
∑
km F
i∗
km ∗Rkm(a,b)
]
(4.12)
subject to:
LMPk(i)(a,b) = φk(i)(ai,a−i, bi,b−i) (4.13)
pGi(a,b) = ϕGi(ai,a−i, bi,b−i) (4.14)
Rkm(a,b) = LMPm(a,b)− LMPk(a,b) (4.15)
for all GenCos i = 1.....I and all nodes k,m = 1.....K and k 6= m. The functions LMPk(i) =
φk(i)(a1, ...a2; b1, .., bI) and pGi = ϕGi(a1, ...a2; b1, ..., bI) result from ISO’s OPF solution as
described above. The vector representing portfolio of FTRs held by a GenCo i is F ∗i = [F
i∗
km],
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which results from FTR-auction optimization problem run by ISO on day D−1 and is taken as
given. Rkm represents the compensation (liability) from holding an Fkm. The result of GenCo
optimization problem is a set of optimal response functions for GenCo i:
ari = ai(a−i,b−i, F
∗
i ) (4.16)
bri = bi(a−i,b−i, F
∗
i ) (4.17)
Now, assuming that pure strategy Nash equilibrium (or a set of equilibria) exists, so that for
each GenCo we can derive optimal strategy pair (a∗i , b
∗
i ), the maximized objective function
(value function) can then be represented as,
V∗i (a
∗,b∗, F ∗i ) ≡ V∗i (pGi(a∗,b∗), LMPk(i)(a∗,b∗), F ∗i ) (4.18)
4.2.4 ISO FTR Auction Formulation
FTRs are acquired by market participants through ISO’s FTR auctions - annual and
monthly - and through a secondary market. In this section we describe the optimization
problem ISO solves in order to decide how to issue FTRs. An FTR bid by a market participant
includes the following parameters: source (point of injection)2 and sink (point of withdrawal)
nodes k,m = 1, 2, .....K and k 6= m; MW amount representing maximum number of an FTR
a bidder is willing to purchase3 – F bkm; and a dollar value representing maximum willingness
to pay for ONE MW of the desired FTR – ρkm ($/MW). For all nodes k,m = 1, 2, ...,K and
k 6= m we define the set of available FTRs as Θ(K). Without loss of generality, we assume that
only GenCos purchase FTRs and submit bids, (F bi , ρi), where F
b
i represents column vector of
maximum amounts of FTRs (for some ordered pairs {k,m}|Fkm ∈ Θ(K)) a GenCo i is willing
to purchase and ρi represents the column vector of bid prices for the corresponding FTRs.
Revenue Adequacy and Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT): A central issue in the provi-
sioning of FTRs by an ISO is revenue adequacy, which means that the congestion rent collection
(in day-ahead market) must be greater than or equal to the total FTR target payment. Addi-
tionally, the set of issued FTRs must satisfy simultaneous feasibility test, which can be stated
2Injection and withdrawal do not imply physical trade of electricity.
3ONE unit of Fkm held by a market participant entitles it to compensation (liability) owing to ONE MW of
power transaction over the path k → m. Also, there need not be a direct physical connection between the two
nodes.
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as following: the physical equivalent, in terms of nodal injections and withdrawals, of each
possible combination of individual FTRs must result in feasible power flow conditions for each
possible topological (n-1 contingency) scenarios of the network. As demonstrated in Sarkar
and Khaparde (2008) and Hogan (1992a), revenue adequacy is guaranteed if the issued set of
FTRs satisfy SFT. Each time there is a change in the configuration of FTRs, the SFT must be
run to ensure that the transmission system can support the set of issued FTRs.
The objective of the auction for the ISO is to award the FTRs to those who value them
the most. The auction value is maximized while respecting the transmission constraints on the
system, which is ensured by running the SFT. The ISO FTR auction is formulated here as a
linear programming problem, so that all constraints are linearized.
max
Fi
I∑
i=1
ρTi · Fi (4.19)
subject to:
I∑
i=1
β · (Fi + F basei ) ≤ PU (4.20)
Fi ≤ F bi i=1,2,...I (4.21)
Here Fi = Mi · F , where F is column vector of all possible FTRs, i.e. Θ(K). Mi is a diagonal
matrix (for GenCo i) mapping the FTRs in F to the decision vector Fi.
Mi = diag
[
I(F ibkm)
]
(4.22)
I(F ibkm) =
 1, if F
ib
km > 0
0, otherwise
F basei represents the exogenously given column vector of base FTRs, F
i,base
km already held by
a GenCo i. As was mentioned in section 2 above, FTRs can be acquired in the auction held
annually or in the subsequent monthly auctions. In case of annual FTR auction F i,basekm = 0 for
all km ∈ BR and for all i, whereas for the monthly auctions the base FTRs maybe be positive
for some paths km ∈ BR. Again, we have assumed that the FTR auction in the problem is the
annual auction and hence, all the base FTRs are set to zero. β represents matrix of PTDF4 βtkm
4Power Transmission Distribution Factor describes the amount of power transmitted through branch t due
to FTR from node k to m. In other words βtkm describes the equivalent amount of power transmitted through
branch t due to 1 MW injection of power by GenCo i at bus k and to be withdrawn at bus m.
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for all branches t ≡ km5 ∈ BR due to FTRs Fkm and PU is the column vector of transmission
line (heat) limits. Constraint () represents conditions ensuring SFT and constraints (21) restrict
the amount of FTRs issued to be less than the maximum amount willing to be purchased by a
GenCo. The Lagrangian for the optimization problem is setup as follows
Λ =
I∑
i=1
ρTi · Fi + µT
(
PU −
I∑
i=1
β · (Fi + F basei )
)
+ αT1 (F
b
1 − F1) + ...+ αTI (F bI − FI) (4.23)
The primal problem results in (if a solution exists for the optimization problem) optimal FTR
allocations F ∗i for all GenCos i = 1, ..., I. As mentioned earlier, not all FTR bids by GenCos
are cleared to the maximum desired levels or even not at all in some cases. The FTRs represent
virtual physical rights over the transmission capacity and hence, the supply limit of the FTRs
is determined by the available transmission capacity. In case some transmission line thermal
limits are reached because of the implied branch flows from allocated FTRs, the Lagrangian
multipliers for such lines are non-negative. The Lagrangian multipliers of constrained transmis-
sion lines are then used to derive the FTR clearing prices (FCP). FCPs for cleared FTRs are
the same for a given branch, irrespective of which GenCo is allocated the right. The following
formula is used to price the cleared FTRs.
FCPkm =
∂Λ∗
∂F i,basekm
=
∑
t∈BR
µt · βtkm (4.24)
where, F i,basekm is the base case FTR for some path km such that, FTR F
i∗
km ≤ F ibkm for some
GenCos i = 1, ...I, i.e. only marginal FTRs (F i∗km not cleared up to the maximum desired
amount F ibkm). The FTR clearing price for an FTR on branch km can be interpreted as the
system cost of providing an extra unit of Fkm, which can be derived by valuing the effect
of additional MW injection at node k (withdrawal at node m) on all capacity constrained
transmission lines. The following properties for FCPs always hold true:
P1. The FCP of a marginal FTR is always equal to the bid price.
P2. The FCP of an FTR cleared fully is less than the bid price.
5The inconvenient notation is regretted. It must be noted that both t and km refer to branches, while km
is also used to reference FTRs. The FTRs are essentially written over branches, but the physical equivalent of
branch power flows implied by an FTRkm are imputed using the PTDFs. Hence, the distinction must be made
between the superscript (branch) and subscript (FTR) when referencing PTDFs.
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P3. The FCP of non-marginal FTR can be expressed as a function of FCPs of the marginal
FTRs.
The proofs for these properties can be shown by simple algebraic rearrangement of the first
order necessary conditions of the optimization problem.
4.2.5 GenCo FTR Choice Problem
The result from the GenCo maximization problem is then considered as a value function,
V∗i (a
∗,b∗, F ∗i ), for the utility maximization problem of bidding for the optimal portfolio of
FTRs.
max
F bi ,ρi
[
−F ∗i (F bi , ρi,Fb−i, ρ−iT ) · FCPi(F bi , ρi,Fb−i, ρ−iT ) + V∗i (a∗,b∗, F ∗i )
]
(4.25)
where all the variables are as explained earlier. Just like the DA market optimal supply choice
problem, it is assumed that the ISO’s FTR allocation problem is transparent to the GenCos.
The GenCos then submit bids to purchase FTRs in order to maximize their net revenues from
holding FTRs, dependant on expected choice of their, as well as that of rivals’, supply offers
in the DA energy market. It is assumed that the GenCos have all information regarding their
own supply offer6 and the rivals’ optimal responses to their strategies.
4.3 Three Bus Grid: Analytical Model
In section 3 above we presented a theoretical framework within which to study the bidding
behavior of GenCos in the two inter-related markets. Here we use a simplified three-bus grid
(fig. A.1) example to establish an information feedback mechanism between the two markets.
4.3.1 Day D Energy Market
We first solve for day D energy market economic dispatch solutions (solved using ISO’s
OPF problem), and the optimal GenCo strategies for submitting supply offers. By the process
6In essence we assume that GenCos have all information about the expected demand and other conditions
affecting supply offer choices in the DA market.
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Figure 4.3 Three Node Grid
of backward induction, we then use the needed results to solve day the D − 1 FTR-auction
problem. In appendix B we solve the dispatch quantities for GenCos submitting supply offers
into the DA energy market auctions for a three-bus grid by solving for optimal branch flows
that complied with the given transmission constraints. In this section we derive the dispatch
quantities by solving the ISO’s Optimal Power Flow problem by maximizing net social benefit
in the presence of transmission and other constraints. It is assumed that the load demand is
high enough so that transmission line 1→ 3 is congested. Also, it is assumed that there are no
generation constraints and that the cost functions are same for the GenCos. The ISO’s OPF
problem7 is formulated as follows:
max
pG1,pG2,pL
(
c · pL − d · p2L
)−∑
i=1,2
(
a0i · pGi + bi · p2Gi
)
subject to.
pG1 + pG2 = pL
β1 · pG1 + β2 · pG2 = PU13 (4.26)
where β1 ≡ β113, β2 ≡ β223 are the PTDFs for injection of 1MW power by GenCos 1 and 2 on
line 1→ 3 respectively. The Lagrangian formulation for the OPF problem is the following.
H =
(
c · pL − d · p2L
)−∑i=1,2 (a0i · pGi + bi · p2Gi)+ λ(pG1 + pG2 − pL) + µ(PU13 − β1 · pG1 − β2 · pG2) (4.27)
7The following reduced form OPF problem is as detailed in Liu et al. (2009). A similar formulation is also
used by Liu and Wu (2007).
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The first order necessary conditions for the OPF problem are the following.
pG1 : −(a1 + 2b1 · pG1) + λ− µ · β1 = 0 (4.28)
pG2 : −(a2 + 2b2 · pG2) + λ− µ · β2 = 0 (4.29)
pL : c− 2d · pL − λ = 0 (4.30)
λ : pG1 + pG2 − pL = 0 (4.31)
µ : PU13 − β1 · pG1 − β2 · pG2 = 0 (4.32)
Solving the OPF yields the following dispatch quantities for the two GenCos,
pG1 =
(c− a01)β22 − (c− a02)β1β2 + 2d(β1 − β2)PU13 + 2b2β1PU13
2d(β21 + β
2
2 − 2β1β2) + 2b1β22 + 2b2β21
pG2 =
(c− a02)β21 − (c− a01)β1β2 + 2d(β2 − β1)PU13 + 2b1β2PU13
2d(β21 + β
2
2 − 2β1β2) + 2b1β22 + 2b2β21
(4.33)
Using the envelope theorem8, the following expressions for LMPs can be derived,
LMP1 = λ
∗ − µ∗ · β1 (4.34)
LMP2 = λ
∗ − µ∗ · β2 (4.35)
LMP3 = λ
∗ (4.36)
Given the dispatch levels and LMPs, the GenCos move simultaneously to choose supply func-
tions to maximize profits from energy production as well as the payoff from FTR portfolio
already acquired. For the ease of analysis, we assume that each GenCo is purely hedging its
production revenues against congestion risks and hence, bids an FTR portfolio accordingly.
In the three-node grid we have used in this paper, the power is injected by GenCos at their
respective buses and withdrawn at the load bus. Hence, GenCos 1 and 2 hold FTRs F 1∗13 and
F 2∗23 respectively. Using first-order conditions of GenCos’ profit functions w.r.t the decision
8We can introduce an exogenously given load demand variable ξk = 0 for each of the nodes and assume the
regularity conditions hold to apply the implicit function theorem to derive these results.
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variable bi, we can derive the optimal response functions for each GenCo,
br1 = b
0
1 +
d·(β22+β21−2β1β2)
β22
+ b2
β21
β22
− 2F
1∗
13 ·(2b22β41+b2·(4β41d−6β31β2d+2β21β22d+b01β21β22))
β42(c−a01)+β1β32(a02−c)−2PU13(β32d−b2β1β22−β1β22d)+2F 1∗13 (b2β21β22+β21β22d−β1β32d)
+
2F 1∗13 ·(2β41d2−6β31β2d2+6β21β22d2+b01β21β22d−2β1β32d2−b01β1β32d)
β42(c−a01)+β1β32(a02−c)−2PU13(β32d−b2β1β22−β1β22d)+2F 1∗13 (b2β21β22+β21β22d−β1β32d)
(4.37)
br2 = b
0
2 +
d·(β22+β21−2β1β2)
β21
+ b1
β22
β21
− 2F
2∗
23 ·(2b21β42+b1·(4β42d−6β32β1d+2β21β22d+b02β22β21))
β41(c−a02)+β2β31(a01−c)−2PU13(β31d−b1β2β21−β2β21d)+2F 2∗23 (b1β22β21+β22β21d−β2β31d)
+
2F 2∗23 ·(2β42d2−6β32β1d2+6β22β21d2+b02β22β21d−2β2β31d2−b02β2β31d)
β41(c−a02)+β2β31(a01−c)−2PU13(β31d−b1β2β21−β2β21d)+2F 2∗23 (b1β22β21+β22β21d−β2β31d)
(4.38)
where, br1 = b1(b2, F
1∗
13 ) is the response function of GenCo 1, w.r.t the reported supply function
coefficient of GenCo 2. At this point it is worth investigating whether pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (or a set of equilibria) exists in the supply offer “bidding” strategy for the two
GenCos.
Effects of FTR Portfolios on Energy Supply Offers
To investigate whether Nash equilibrium (or a set of equilibria) exists in the supply offer
“bidding” strategy for the two GenCos, we assume the numerical values for the various demand
and cost function parameters as in Liu and Wu (2007). The system inverse demand function
is given as,
Dj(pLj) = 50− 0.02 · pLj (4.39)
The generators’ quadratic cost function is given as
Ci(pGi) = 2 · pGi + .015 · p2Gi (4.40)
Since FTRs are already acquired, we can also treat those as constants and assume numerical
values based on the following feasibility constraint.
β1 · F 113 + β2 · F 223 ≤ PU13 (4.41)
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where β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.25 and P
U
13 = 300 MW. By assuming that the FTRs acquired by the
two GenCos are in certain ratios (while respecting the above constraint as an equality), we
plot the resulting reaction functions to check for the existence of equilibria. Fig. 4.4 presents
the cases for non-existence of pure-strategy Nash supply-function equilibria, while for the FTR
portfolios shown in Fig. 4.5, pure-strategy Nash supply-function equilibria exist.
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Figure 4.4 No Pure Strategy Nash-Supply Function Equilibria
The results for the case of no FTRs held by either firm are similar to the one derived by Liu
and Wu (2007), i.e., no pure strategy supply-function equilibria exist. However, it is interesting
to note that if the FTRs held by the two firms are in certain specific ratios, then there seems to
exist unique equilibria in the strategy space of the supply offer slope coefficient. This reaffirms
our conjecture that that the GenCo “bidding” strategy in the DA energy market must be
affected by portfolio of FTRs already acquired. It is also interesting to note that GenCo 1’s
optimal response is to submit negative slope coefficients, i.e. br1 < 0, for certain values of b2.
In effect, GenCo 1 submits a downward sloping supply offer9 in response to GenCo 2’s supply
offer (not necessarily optimal b2’s). Thus, it appears that GenCo 1 is willing to accept losses
from the physical energy sales by bidding below the true marginal cost of operation b01. By
bidding strategically, the GenCo is creating/relieving congestion in the grid so as to maximize
the total revenues from the sale of energy as well as payoff from holding FTRs.
9It should be strongly noted that, in reality, GenCos are NOT allowed to submit downward sloping supply
offers. The ISO rearranges the blocks of supply offers submitted by GenCos in order to have upward sloping
supply offers.
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To illustrate this point, we will use the case where only GenCo 1 holds FTRs ,i.e.,
F 1∗13 =
PU13
β1
F 2∗23 = 0
and compare GenCo1’s net-earnings, FTR revenues and energy sales revenues when submitting
supply offers strategically against when it submits the true marginal cost function,
br1 = b
0
1 ∀ b2
The latter case will henceforth be referred to as the benchmark case. Also, GenCo 1’s supply
offer slope coefficient has been constrained to always be nonnegative, i.e. br1 ≥ 0, so that it
cannot submit negatively sloped “supply” function. However, as can be seen from Fig. 4.6(a),
GenCo 1’s optimal response to GenCo 2’s supply offer b2 is to always bid below its true marginal
cost slope coefficient.
From Fig. 4.6(d) below we can see that the net earnings of GenCo 1 are higher than the
benchmark case even though, br1 = 0 and much below the true slope coefficient b
0
1 = 0.015.
Hence, as seen from Fig. 4.6(e) it is clear that GenCo 1 is losing money in energy sales, while
being compensated due to higher FTR revenues, as shown in Fig. 4.6(f). The following equation
should help make this point clearer. For notational convenience, (b1, b2) will be referred to as
(·):
NetEarnings1(·) = LMP1(·) ∗ pG1(·)− (a01 ∗ pG1(·) + b01 ∗ p2G1(·))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Energy sales revenue
+ (LMP3(·)− LMP1(·)) ∗ F13︸ ︷︷ ︸
FTR revenue
(4.42)
By offering to supply at constant marginal cost, i.e br1 = 0, which is always less than GenCo 2’s
reported supply function slope parameter b2, GenCo1 is dispatched at higher level as compared
to the benchmark case (see Fig. 4.6(c)). However, to maintain the transmission constraint to
hold at equality 10, an additional 1 MW injection of power by GenCo 1 requires reduction
in GenCo2 dispatch by 2 MW11. Hence, the aggregate system supply decreases (compared
10For the case of no transmission grid congestion, the payoffs from FTRs becomes zero, and hence is not of
relevance to this analysis.
11The result derives from the grid configuration, i.e, β113 = 2β
2
13, which causes the power flowing on line P
U
13
due to injection at bus 1 to be twice of that due to power injected at bus 2.
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to benchmark case) causing the price paid at load bus, LMP3 to increase. Hence, the LMP
differential LMP3 − LMP1 increases, which can be seen in Fig. 4.6(b) and the GenCo gains
higher revenues from holding FTRs.
However, it must be noted that the dispatch amounts, pG1 < F13 ∀ br1 (see Fig. 4.6(c)) and
as seen from Eq(4.42) the drop-off from energy revenues, due to lower LMP at generation bus,
is less than gain from FTR revenues because of higher LMP differential between the load bus
and generation bus. The results might change substantially for lower amounts of F13 held by
GenCo 1.
4.3.2 Day D − 1 FTR Auction
In the FTR auction each bidder intends to maximize its utility from holding FTRs after
considering its own production decision in the next period as well as its opponent’s bidding
strategies in the present period, subject to the ISO’s FTR market clearing results. The two-
level optimization problem is similar to the economic dispatch problem presented above. In
the first level, the ISO maximizes FTR auction revenue given the FTR bids and subject to
transmission and other contingency constraints. GenCos 1 and 2 bid F 1b13 and F
2b
23 , respectively.
The ISO’s auction revenue maximization problem is,
max
F 113,F
2
23
ρ113 · F 113 + ρ223 · F 223
subject to:
β1 · F 113 + β2 · F 223 ≤ PU13
0 ≤ F 113 ≤ F 1b13
0 ≤ F 223 ≤ F 2b13 (4.43)
The Lagrangian is presented below followed by the graphical solution (fig. 4.7) for the linear
programming problem.
Λ = ρ113 · F 113 + ρ223 · F 223 + µ13[PU13 − β1 · F 113 + β2 · F 223] + α1 · [F 1b13 − F 113] + α2 · [F 2b23 − F 223] (4.44)
77
rb2
rb1
b1
b2
(a) Reaction Functions: br1 and b
r
2
b2
(b) LMPs: LMP1 and LMP3
b2
(c) Dispatch Amount: PG1 and FTR: F13
rb
0
1b
1
GenCo 1 Net Earnings
GenCo 1 Net Earnings: Benchmark
b2
(d) Total Net Earnings
rb1GenCo 1 Energy Sales Net Earnings
b2
0
1bGenCo 1 Energy Sales Net Earnings: Benchmark Case
(e) Energy Sales Revenues
0b
rb1GenCo 1 FTR Revenues
GenCo 1 FTR Revenue: Benchmark 1
b2
(f) FTR Revenues
Figure 4.6 GenCo 1 Dispatch, Net Earnings, FTR- and Energy-Sales Revenues
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The first order necessary conditions are as following:
F 113 : ρ
1
13 − µ13 · β1 − α1 = 0 (4.45)
F 223 : ρ
2
23 − µ13 · β2 − α2 = 0 (4.46)
µ13 : P
U
13 − β1 · F 113 + β2 · F 223 ≥ 0 ⊥ µ (4.47)
α1 : F
1b
13 − F 113 ≥ 0 ⊥ α1 (4.48)
α1 : F
2b
23 − F 223 ≥ 0 ⊥ α2 (4.49)
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Figure 4.7 FTR Auction Graphical Solution
The graph shows the various constraints where the dashed boxes indicate the direction of fea-
sible region. The feasible set of solutions is depicted using the thicker line. Finally, depending
on the value of FTR bid price ratio,
∣∣∣ρ113ρ223 ∣∣∣, either of the two shown iso-revenue lines is feasible.
Based on these fact, the results for the linear programming problem are summarized as follows.
Case 1: ∣∣∣ρ113ρ223 ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣β1β2 ∣∣∣ =⇒
 F
1∗
13 = F
1b
13 ; α1 ≥ 0
F 2∗23 < F 2b23 ; α2 = 0
79
The resultant allocation of FTRs is as follows:
F 1∗13 = F
1b
13 (4.50)
F 2∗23 =
PU13 + β1F
1b
13
β2
(4.51)
The FCPs for the awarded FTRs can be calculated using the formula in equation (24) and
from the first order necessary conditions.
FCP13 = µ13 · β1 = ρ113 − α1 = ρ223 ·
β1
β2
(4.52)
FCP23 = µ13 · β2 = ρ223 (4.53)
The results verify the properties 1-3 for FTR clearing prices presented in section 3.4 above.
It can be seen that the FCP23 of the marginal FTR is equal to the bid price ρ23 and that
the FCP13 of FTR cleared in full is less than bid price ρ13. Also, FCP13 can be expressed a
function of bid price ρ23 of the marginal FTR. Similarly, results are symmetric for the other case.
Case 2: ∣∣∣ρ113ρ223 ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣β1β2 ∣∣∣ =⇒
 F
1∗
13 < F
1b
13 ; α1 = 0
F 2∗23 = F 2b23 ; α2 ≥ 0
The resultant allocation of FTRs is as follows:
F 2∗23 = F
2b
23 (4.54)
F 1∗13 =
PU13 + β2F
2b
23
β1
(4.55)
The FTR clearing prices are as follows:
FCP23 = µ13 · β2 = ρ223 − α2 = ρ113 ·
β2
β1
(4.56)
FCP13 = µ13 · β1 = ρ113 (4.57)
4.4 Three-Bus Grid: Agent Based Model
As suggested by the discussion in previous sections, the study of risk management in whole-
sale power markets is complex, requiring detailed modeling and analysis of strategic decision
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making by market participants, market operators, and oversight agencies. Analytical models
are not able to sufficiently address the complexity of this decision making process. In this
section we present an alternate approach that uses reinforcement learning (RI)) to model the
behavior of GenCos in the two markets. The model uses a two-tier matrix game approach to
obtain the joint-optimal bidding strategies in the two markets, when the GenCos compete with
each other to maximize the individual net-earnings.
A similar approach has been used by Babayigit et al. (2010) to study the same problem.
However, their study differs from our work in two significant ways: 1) The form of objective
function in ISO’s FTR auction used in ) differs from the general form used by ISOs. We have
used the more general form of objective function as seen in ISO-NE tutorial on FTR auctions),
2) The primary objective of their study was to validate the modeling method by comparing
theie results to the well established results from an earlier study by Joskow and Tirole. The
authors were able to illustrate the existence of Nash equilibrium in supply offer strategies, given
certain portfolios of FTR already acquired. They also show the effects of FTR portfolios on
suppy offer strategies, and the overall joint payoffs. However, the effect of “anticipated” supply
offer strategies on FTR bidding strategies was not established.
In this paper, we establish the feedback mechanism in the bidding strategies of two markets.
The results show that GenCos’ FTR bidding strategies are affected by supply offer strategies
based on the following factors: 1) Location on the grid, 2) Thermal limits on transmission lines.
A description of the process is now presented.
4.4.1 Two-Tier Matrix Game Approach
A two-tier matrix game approach was used to replicate the process of backward induction,
used commonly in solving multi-stage game theoretic models. The upper tier matrix represents
the FTR auction (Stage 1), and the bottom layer represents the day-ahead energy market. At
each stage the GenCos can choose from a set of action choices. The process of obtaining joint
bidding strategies, as depicted in Fig. 4.4.1, involves 2 players that select from N different FTR
portfolios, and J = 2 12 supply offer choices. The process involves the following steps:
12The set of action strategies is arbitrarily chosen in order to ease the exposition of the two-tier game process.
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1. In Stage 1, GenCoi, for i = 1, 2 selects FTR portfolio FTR
n
i , for n = 1..N
2. In Stage 2, calculate the payoff matrix for different combinations ofGenCoi energy supply-
offer strategies anij , for j = 1, 2, given FTR
n
i
3. Use reinforcement (RI) learning to solve Stage 2 problem to obtain supply offer strategies
that yield net earning, NEni (a
n
1j , a
n
2j)
4. Assign NEni (a
n
1j , a
n
2j) as net earnings for the given FTR portfolio combination.
5. Use RI learning to solve Stage 1 problem to obtain the FTR portfolios.
The iterative method described above yields the joint bidding strategies for the GenCos and
the overall joint payoff from the two markets. The biggest advantage of using this method
is that it allows analysis to proceed even in cases where no pure-strategy Nash equilibria, in
supply offer strategies, exist13.
4.4.2 GenCo Action Set Selection
We will now describe the process used to setup action choices of GenCos in the two markets.
4.4.2.1 Day-Ahead Market Action Choice Set
GenCo report their marginal production cost functions as supply offers in DA market, de-
fined as Ci(pGi) = a
0
i +2b
0
i pGi, for i = 1, 2, ...I, where a
0
i and b
0
i represent the ordinate and slope
of true marginal cost. So, the supply offers reported GenCo i, consist of the pair (ari , b
r
i ). The
GenCos also report the pair (CapL, CapU ) as lower and upper production capacities. However,
we assume that the upper and lower capacities are fixed at the true levels. Additionally, to
further simplify the model we use a single multiplier dai to obtain the reported supply offer,
dai ∗ (a0i , b0i ). Finally, the supply offer choice variable is allowed to be either (high, true, low),
13As shown in Nanduri and Das ), reinforcement learning algorithm can be used to derive pure-strategy
equilibria. However, various researchers such as Wilson, Oren), have shown that existence of pure-strategy
supply function equilibria cannot be guaranteed.
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Figure 4.8 Two-Tier Matrix Game Approach for Joint-Optimal Bidding Strategies
i.e.,
dai =

daHi , if dai > 1
daTi , if dai = 1
daLi , if dai < 1
4.4.2.2 FTR-Auction Action Choice Set
FTR auction demand bid parameters for GenCo i located at bus i are following:
• Source bus i and sink bus 3
• Maximum price willing to pay: ρi3 $/MW
• Maximum amount willing to buy: FTRMaxi3 MW
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Like the DA market a single multiplier fi is used to obtain the FTR demand bids fi ∗
(ρi3, FTR
Max
i3 ) for the GenCos. The action choices in FTR auction are also allowed to be
either of (high, true, low),
fi =

fHi , if fi > 1
fTi , if fi = 1
fLi , if fi < 1
The payoff from an FTR portfolio is settled from the congestion rent collected after the settle-
ment of DA market. Hence, if all GenCos are risk neutral, the theory of rational expectations
says that the FTR demand bid price and quantity reflect the expectations of GenCo’s FTR
payoffs (and hence, the congestion rent “owed” by them) after the settlement of DA mar-
ket.“True” FTR demand bid parameters (ρi3, FTR
Max
i3 ) are set so that, if all FTR demand
bids are “true,” and all DA energy supply offers are “true,” then for all GenCos i = 1...I,
FTR Payment of GenCo i = FTR Revenue (Congestion Rent) of GenCo i
This condition implies that if all GenCos are truth telling in both the marets and bid for FTRs
based on the expectations of DA market settlements, then the total amount paid by all Gen-
Cos to the ISO in the FTR auction equals the congestion rent collected (and hence, the FTR
payoff they receive) in DA market.This condition also implies that GenCo i has fully hedged
its congestion risk in the DA market.
Hence, given that the above conditions hold, Oren et al ) demonstrate the equivalence
between FTR auction and DA market, and
FTR Auction Revenue = Congestion Rent in DA Market
4.4.3 Results
To see how the GenCos learn their bidding strategies in the two markets, the same three bus
grid was used as in the analytical model presented above. Additionally, to study the effects of
spatial location on a GenCo’s bidding strategies, we imposed thermal limit on one transmission
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line at a time. The action sets for the two GenCos were selected as reported earlier and the
bidding strategies were obtained using the process described in section. The process was run
50 times.
Case 1: Thermal Limit on Line 1→ 3
The bidding strategies for the two GenCos, in FTR and DA markets, when thermal limit
is imposed on line 1 → 3 are shown in Fig. 4.4.3. The end points of the blue vertical line
represent bidding strategies of GenCo1 in the FTR auction and DA market, respectively for
one particular run. The results show that GenCo1 reports true or lower than true marginal
cost of production in 48 out of the 50 runs.
In general, a GenCo with low marginal cost of production will be dispatched before a GenCo
with higher marginal cost14. Hence, by reporting lower than true marginal cost as the energy
supply offer, GenCo1 raises the chance of getting dispatched to provide energy.
Also, 1MW power injection by GenCo1 at bus 1 causes twice as much power flow on
transmission line 1 → 3 as compared to 1MW power injection by GenCo2. Hence, GenCo1
causes thermal limit constrained line 1→ 3 to become congested faster than GenCo2.
Finally, given that there is no production capacity limit on either GenCo, the LMPs at
their respective buses (if they are dispatched) reflect the marginal costs of production of the
last unit of power produced by the GenCos. Hence, a low marginal cost reported by GenCo1
implies lower LMP at its bus compared to what the LMP would be, if the GenCo had reported
true marginal cost as its energy supply offer. This implies that the GenCo is willing to take
losses from its energy sales. However, low LMP at bus 1 also implies that the LMP differentials
are higher, for instance, LMP3 − LMP1 increases as LMP1 decreases. Thus, the payoff from
GenCo1’s FTR portfolio increases if the LMP differentials increase.
If GenCo1 is able to “create” enough revenues from its FTR portfolio to offset the losses
from energy sales, then the logical strategy in FTR auction is to bid high price, in order to
secure as many of the desirable FTRs. We can see from Fig. 4.4.3 that GenCo1 ALWAYS
selects high action choice in the FTR market. Hence, it can be concluded that GenCo1 is able
14In certain cases of grid congestion patterns, low cost GenCo might be able to be dispatched before the higher
cost GenCo.
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to learn to utilize its locational advantage i order to maximize the combined payoffs from the
two revenue sources.
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Figure 4.9 GenCo1 and GenCo2 Action Choices when Thermal Limit on line 1→ 3
GenCo2, on the other hand, does no gain much from reporting low marginal cost as its
energy supply offer in the DA market, and its dominant strategy is to report true or higher
than true marginal cost of production. Consequently, GenCo2 is not able to create simlar LMP
differentials due to the higher LMP at bus 2, and so, it does not gain much from a bigger
portfolio of FTRs. We can see that GenCo 2 has no clear or dominant strategy to submit
demand bids in the FTR auction.
Case 2: Thermal Limit on Line 1→ 2
The action choices of the GenCos in FTR auction and DA market, when thermal limit is
imposed on line 1→ 2, are shown in Fig. 4.4.3. It is clear that both GenCos choose to report
true or higher than true marginal cost of production as their supply offers. Consequently, the
LMPs at their respective buses are also high, and hence, the LMP differences are not high
enough to increase the payoffs from FTR portfolios. We can see that the GenCos have no clear
dominant strategy to submit demand bids in FTR auction, as can be seen from the results.
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Figure 4.10 GenCo1 and GenCo2 Action Choices when Thermal Limit on line 1→ 2
4.5 Conclusion
By design, the bidding strategies in physical and financial electric power markets are intri-
cately connected. Additionally, the market participants interact with others in either competi-
tive or cooperative manner, in both the markets. The impact of market participants’ strategic
behavior/interaction can have significant impact on the outcomes of the two markets. In this
study, we established a theoretical framework to analyze the bidding strategies of the market
participants. We demonstrated the impact of FTR portfolios on the supply offer strategies
of market participants in day-ahead markets. In particular, we see that pure strategy Nash-
supply function equilibrium exists only for some combinations of FTR portfolios. We then used
agent-based model to study the joint bidding strategies of market participants. It was observed
that the market participants are able to systematically coordinate their strategies in the two
markets. We also see that the location of market participants on the grid, i.e., the proximity
to capacity constrained transmission line has a significant impact on their bidding behavior.
In some cases the market participants are willing to make losses from the sale of energy in the
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day-ahead market, as long as the revenue from FTR portfolio is large enough to compensate
for the losses.
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CHAPTER 5. Strategic Wind Trading by Firms with Mixed Portfolio of
Generation Assets
The renewable portfolio standards (RPS) being enforced in various states and regions within
the US have made it imperative for utilities to acquire from 15% to 33% of their energy from
renewable resources. Although at present only about 3% of the total electric power produced
in the US is from wind, as more US states begin enforcing RPS schemes the bulk of this
renewable energy is expected to come from wind. The market rules governing wind power are
still evolving, and could lead to profitable opportunities for some firms while disadvantaging
others. The resulting market outcomes will depend on the exact nature of rules and the mix
of generation assets owned by firms in a region. In this study we will examine the effects
of market rules on the trading strategies of profit-seeking firms that supply electric power
in wholesale markets using portfolios of generation assets that combine both conventional and
wind resources. The findings from this study should generalize to any renewable energy resource
for which uncertain generation is a major factor.
5.1 Introduction
Ownership structure in an industry can have substantial effects on the overall efficiency of
market operations. It has been observed that financial bonding of generation and utility com-
pany could reduce a generator’s incentive to exercise market power1. However, a generation
company with units located at different buses of the grid could influence prices (and dispatch
quantities) by physical and/or financial witholding of power (Somani and Tesfatsion (2008)).
For example, Enron, in 2000, found it profitable to shut down some generation units causing
1Vertical integration implies that the company with ownership of both generation and distribution, transacts
power at the same price and hence, has no incentive to influence the price outcomes
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transmission congestion and higher prices for its other generation sites. The strategic reporting
of supply offers led to wild price spikes in the short-term, and eventual break down of the
electricity grid. Many lessons from the disastrous chapter have been learned, and regional elec-
tricity market monitoring agencies have implemented various market power mitigation policies
to keep a strict vigil on the activities of market participants.
Bulk of electricity in US is produced using coal and gas fired power plants. However, given
the recent moves towards greater self reliance for energy needs, as well as driven by a need to
switch to cleaner renewable generation sources, wind power has gained focus through various
political initiatives. However, electric energy production from wind is very uncertain and wind
flow prediction remains a very complex problem2 and hence, wind energy producers are not
subject to the strict market rules adhered to by other conventional generation sources. Wind
is usually considered as negative load (demand), which reduces the need to dispatch power
from other conventional sources. Increased penetration of wind would, presumably, affect
the energy and reserve requirements (from conventional generation units) needed to maintain
reliable supply of electric power. Hence, as wind penetration increases over the years, so might
the uncertainty associated with electric power generation from conventional energy sources.
The market rules governing wind energy are still evolving. As will be explained in some detail
later, generation companies with diverse portfolio of generation fuel units (i.e., owning both
conventional generators and wind farms) could utilize the market rules to maximize their joint
profits by reporting supply offers strategically.
To our knowledge, the impact of wind power on market operations while considering the
ownership structure of a firm, has not yet been studied. In Wang et al. (2008), Meibom (2007)
and Jonsson et al. (2010), the authors analyze the impact of uncertain wind on the electricity
market auction mechanism, without any explicitly modeled market structure. In Botterud
et al. (2010), the authors present the optimal bidding strategies of wind farmers under different
assumptions of risk preferences. However, the model is simplified by assuming that the wind
farmers are price takers and also, that they own no other generation sources. In reality, strategic
2See ANL () for a comprehensive list of work on wind power forecasting
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bidding by wind farms3 can create price scenarios that either directly increase the wind farm’s
profits or of the other generation resources owned by the same company.
In this study, we will examine the bidding strategies of horizontally integrated firms that
supply electric energy using a portfolio of generation assets. The organization of this chapter
is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of restructured electricity markets, along with the
dynamics of the two-settlement energy market process. Section 3 provides strategic incentives
of mixed generation portfolio companies using data from MISO markets, as well as analytical
and simulation models. Section 3 presents a two-bus grid analytical to study optimal bidding
strategies of horizontally integrated firms. Section 5 presents results from numerical model
where wind plant’s optimal supply offer strategy is modeled as a bi-level optimization problem.
Section 6 provides general conclusions and proposed future work.
5.2 Restructured Electricity Markets – Overview
Electric power industries around the world have undergone restructuring - from government
regulated to more market oriented. Restructuring has entailed unbundling of hitherto vertically
integrated organizations into independently managed generation, transmission and distribution
systems. As a result, electric power markets can be divided into wholesale and retail layers.
The wholesale power market design proposed by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) in an April 2003 white paper FERC (2003) encompasses the following core
features: central oversight by an independent system operator (ISO); a two-settlement system
consisting of a day-ahead market supported by a parallel real-time market to ensure continual
balancing of supply and demand for power.
We will now describe the day-ahead and real-time energy markets in some detail.
3Other generation units can engage in strategic bidding also. However, generation capacities and production
costs of conventional units are known in advance and hence, can be more closely monitored by market agencies.
Wind being an uncertain source of energy can attribute over/under reporting of generation capacity to subjective
assessment of wind flow forecasts.
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5.2.1 Day-Ahead Energy Market
Most conventional generators require advanced notice to start. By operating a financially
binding day-ahead market, the ISOs allow generators to receive operating schedules ahead of
time, and provides a financial incentive for them to perform as scheduled. Fig. 5.1 shows the
timing of daily operations at Midwest ISO (MISO).
Figure 5.1 ISO activities during a typical day D
Day-ahead energy market is a purely financial market, i.e., no real (physical) injection or
withdrawal of electric power takes place. The cleared dispatch quantities and the associated
LMPs can be thought of as forward contracts to sell(buy) power, between the ISOs and the
generation companies(load serving entities). Like a forward contract in any other commodity,
the parties (buyers or sellers) must make whole the contract on the actual trading day (the day
after the settlement of day-ahead market) and any shortfalls in generation (or additional load
demand) must be accommodated in the real time by the ISO.
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5.2.2 Real-Time Energy Market
Real-time energy markets are also sometimes referred to as spot-markets and the physical
“exchange” of power contracted in the day-ahead market takes place in real-time markets.
Because there is always some deviation in real time of actual generation and load from what
was scheduled in the day-ahead market, one of the key functions of an ISO is to perform
real-time balancing of loads and generation. The ISO performs this through the real-time
imbalance energy market, which is the mechanism whereby supply resources are selected to
be increased (incremented) or decreased (decremented) in order to maintain system balance.
The appropriate awards (penalties) are paid to (paid by) the involved entities that are used in
creating system balance.
If there is no change in system condition from the time of day-ahead scheduling to the
real-time opearations, and the demand and wind conditions are exactly as predicted, then the
LMPs in the two markets are exactly equal, i.e., there are no arbitrage opportunities. However,
almost always the conditions deviate and often in unexpected ways, like transmission line or
generation unit break downs that necessitate bringing up reserve units or other units out of
merit-order causing regular price spikes in the real-time. On average however, the day-ahead
LMPs observed in reality are higher than the corresponding real-time LMPs, which shows that
arbitrage opportunities exist that can be utilized by market participants4.
5.3 Horizontal Integration and Market Power
In this section 5 we will first present data from Midwest ISO power market that gives an
idea of the existing ownership structure in the midwest region. We then used an analytical
model provide some intuition for strategic reporting of wind supply offers by firms with mixed
generation portfolios. Finally, we use simulation results to show the affects of wind power with-
4Many ISO’s now allow virtual bidding whereby market participants even with no physical assets can bid to
supply or buy power in the day-ahead market, but must close out their positions by buying back (or selling) the
same amount in the real-time market. It is argued that virtual bidders should help in drawing down arbitrage
opportunities by utilizing any information that might be causing deviation in prices in the day-ahead and real-
time markets. However, the virtual markets in most ISO’s (except PJM) are still young and evolving, so the
jury is still out.
5I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Huan Zhao who worked very hard to complete this
section with me.
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olding (in day-ahead market relative to real-time market) on net-earnings of other generation
units.
5.3.1 Midwest ISO Market Data
We now present some data, reported by Midwest ISO, to give an idea of the industry
structure in the midwest region. The facts presented might illustrate how much the industry
strucutre matters in determining the incentives that generation companies might have to act
strategically in order to influence market outcomes. The MISO day-ahead cleared supply offer
data files show information takes the following tree structure:
Generation Company (Unique ID) → Generation Company. Generation Unit (Unique ID)
→ Generation Unit. Unit Type (Unit Type ID)
These data show which generation companies were dispatched to produce, using which of
their units, where each unit is distinguished by type. From these data one can determine the
actual mix of generation fuels used by the generation companies. In addition, one can determine
the size of each generation company relative to the market as a whole as measured in terms of
total revenues earned.
Table I provides a breakdown of the total energy dispatched in the MISO on November
16, 2010, sorted by unit type. The data are aggregated across all generation companies for all
24 hours. It can be seen that total cleared wind dispatch is second only to total cleared coal
dispatch, and similarly for total revenues earned.
Table 5.1 Total Cleared Dispatch by Unit Type for Day-Ahead Market on 11/16/2010
Unit Type Unit Type Code Total Energy Dispatch (MWh) Total Revenue ($) % of Total Energy Dispatch % of Total Revenue
Steam Turbine 4 1,327,256.50 37,278,036.16 92.11 93.51
Comine Cycle ST 5 0 0 0 0
Combustion Turbine 27 9210.30 349988.23 0.64 0.88
Diesel 31 281.00 8705.06 0.02 0.02
Run of River 41 16817.60 411183.43 1.17 1.03
Pumped Storage 42 1200.00 42638.00 0.08 0.11
Combine Cycle CT 51 0 0 0 0
Combine Cycle Aggregate 52 17651.10 542053.74 1.22 1.36
Wind 61 42,271.40 664,749.67 2.93 1.67
Other Fossil 71 25977.30 560628.45 1.80 1.41
Other Peaker 72 0 0 0 0
Demand Response Type 1 87 0 0 0 0
Deman Response Type 2 88 249.00 6978.67 0.02 0.02
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In Table II we report cleared coal and wind dispatch amounts, aggregated across all 24 hours
of Novembers 16, 2010, for all MISO generation companies that own both coal and wind plants.
The coal and wind energy dispatch levels are separately listed for each owner, as identified by
MISO owner codes.
Table 5.2 Companies Cleared to Dispatch Both Coal and Wind Energy on 11/16/2010
Owner Code Wind (MWh) Coal (MWh)
122062454 480.0 53310.6
122062463 48.0 240.0
122062474 226.0 7735.6
122062486 279.0 8899.6
122062512 1738.0 3651.3
122062517 263.0 26163.0
122062548 0 6151.0
122062550 5231.8 20183.0
122062553 744.0 4550.0
122062561 683.2 15476.5
122062581 512.0 38415.4
122062590 9115.0 85147.8
122062603 836.2 8275.3
122062624 319.0 12278.4
122062627 243.0 0
122062642 2253.0 38385.2
122062646 1109.0 0
122062647 268.0 374.4
122062649 1257.8 29852.6
125767546 1770.0 8459.0
226474818 73.3 150353.6
395307103 1014.0 121690.8
576468110 2211.0 26958.0
576468116 1294.0 21762.6
Total 31968.3 688313.7
Market Total 42271.0 1327300.0
% of Total 75.6% 51.8%
Note that the generation companies that were cleared to produce about 50% of total coal
energy for the day were also cleared to produce about 75% of the total wind energy for the
same day. This suggests that these companies could have an incentive to report strategic supply
offers that take advantage of possible synergies between coal and wind generation.
Interestingly, however, the supply offers for conventional generation units in the MISO
are observed to be rather constant over time. Consequently, in this study we will focus on
the potential for profitable strategic wind trading by generation companies that own both
conventional and wind generation, while the supply offers from conventional generation sources
are reported “truthfully”. In particular, we will investigate the potential for wind plants to
profitably under/over- report in day-ahead markets, relative to the expected real-time wind
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power output. Determining the exercise under/over-reporting by wind plants purely from
empirical data is complicated due to the uncertainty of wind generation. The inter- and intra-
day variability observed between reported supply offers and actual wind power output could
simply be the result of intermittent wind flow.
To get around this problem, we use empirically-grounded analytical and computational
models to study the strategic wind-trading opportunities open to mixed-portfolio generation
companies. These modeling efforts are described in the following section.
5.3.2 Incentives for Strategic Wind Power Supply Offers
The following symbols are used in the model:
Table 5.3 Description of Variables
Variable Desription
pi Net revenue of the multi-fuel generation company at state 0
sida Conventional generator i’s offer in day-ahead
sirt Conventional generator i’s offer in real-time
swda Wind power’s offer in day-ahead
pdi Conventional generator i’s cleared dispatch in day-ahead
pri Conventional generator i’s cleared dispatch in real-time
prw Wind power injection in real-time
lmpdi Conventional generator i’s cleared price in day-ahead
lmpri Conventional generator i’s cleared price in real-time
lmpdw Wind power’s cleared price in day-ahead
lmprw Wind power’s cleared price in real-time
In this section, we are going to discuss how the wind capacity withholding behavior affects
a mixed-portfolio generation company’s (MGC) net revenue. This model follows the market
rules adopted by Midwest ISO, and focuses on the two-settlement market operation described
earlier.
Suppose there are a set of N buses on the power grid, and there can be more than one
generation company selling power to the wholesale market. Starting with the simplest case,
we assume that wind bidding is the only variable between day-ahead and real-time market.
This assumption also relies on the market rules (and empirical observation) that conventional
generation units can not change their real-time supply offers due to economic reasons while
wind generation, as an intermittent resource, is taken as is in the real-time. Hence, wind power
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could deviate from day-ahead supply offer in real-time market. With this simplification, if the
generation company’s day-ahead wind supply offer swda equals the real-time wind power injection
prw, the two markets will run under the same conditions. Therefore, day-ahead market cleared
LMP at bus i, lmpdi is the same as real-time, lmp
r
i . Similarly, day-ahead market cleared power
dispatch pdi is the same as real-time dispatch, p
r
i . Notice that, we use p
i to stand for cleared
power dispatch at bus i, and use si to stand for supply offer.
In this market, there exists an MGC M that has both conventional and wind power gener-
ators. Conventional power generator is located at bus i, where i ∈ M , and wind generator is
located at bus w. We assume that company has full information about real-time market wind
availability, prw, i.e., they can make accurate forecast of wind power. The MGC searches for
the best wind bidding strategy to maximize the total net earnings pi. Suppose that company
M is the only company that strategically reports the wind supply offer, and hence, it is the
only resource that deviates in real-time from day-ahead.
For a typical day-ahead operation, generation company makes prediction of prw for next
day’s wind power. Following the above discussion, the real-time operation state and system
variables are hence determined. Real-time wind power prw is an exogenous variable. Given
prw and all conventional generators real-time offer s
i
r, which are same as day-ahead offers, the
real-time power dispatch pri and LMPs lmp
r
i are determined from real-time DCOPF. Therefore,
real-time system variables do not depend on day-ahead wind bidding. Then the net-earning
company M is,
pi =
∑
i∈M
pdi (s
w
da) · lmpdi (swda) +
∑
i∈M
(pri − pdi (swd )) · lmpri+
pdw · lmpdw(swda) + (prw0 − pdw) · lmprw −
∑
i∈M
C(pri )
(5.1)
Equation (5.1) shows that the generation company’s net earning is a function of its day-
ahead wind bidding. Then it will seek for the best wind supply to maximize the net earning.
When we look at the effect of wind bidding on other bus’s dispatch, we need to consider
the topology of the network. As shown in Zhou et al. (2010), keeping the unit commitment
and supply offers unchanged, there exists a linear relationship between system variables and
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load perturbation, within a certain system pattern6. We first analyze wind bidding behavior at
the point where the true expected real-time wind power is bid into the day-ahead market, i.e.,
swda = p
r
w. Suppose this point lies inside a certain system pattern, then a small perturbation of
wind bidding will not change the determinants of the linear relationship. Denote
∂lmpdi
∂pdw
= αi,
and
∂pdi
∂pdw
= βi, for all i, the differential of generation company’s total net earning w.r.t. wind
supply offer is as follow:
∂pi
∂swda
|swda=prw =
∑
i∈M
αi · pdi +
∑
i
βi · (lmpdi − lmpri ) + αw · pdw + (lmpdw − lmprw)
=
∑
i∈M
αi · pdi + αw · pdw
(5.2)
The second equality results from that the fact that in the neighborhood of pdw = p
r
w, day-
ahead price will be approximately same as the real-time price. In general, αi < 0 since more
wind production leads to reduction in power produced by generation units with higher produc-
tion costs, and hence decrease in system price7. Suppose that αi < 0, then
dpi
dpdw
< 0, which
means that hybrid GenCo has incentive to bid lower wind power in the day-ahead market.
If generation company deviates from its true expectation of real-time wind availability and
witholds wind power in the day-ahead market, it will create positive price difference (lmpdi −
lmprw) > 0, i.e., inter-temporal arbitrage opportunity. Then equation (5.2) becomes:
∂pi
∂swda
|swda<prw =
∑
i∈M
αi · pdi +
∑
i∈M
βi · (lmpdi − lmpri ) + αw · pd − w + (lmpdw − lmprw)
=
∑
i∈M
αi · pdi + αw · pdw + (lmpdw − lmprw) +
∑
i∈M
βi · (lmpdi − lmpri )
=
∑
i∈M
αi · pdi + αw · pdw + (
∑
i∈M
βi · αi + αw) ·∆pw
(5.3)
The power injection and withdrawal in the grid must be in balance at all times, so that
the extra injection of wind power in real time must be compensated by power reduction by
other units, i.e.,
∑
i∈N
βi + 1 = 0, where N is the set of all generators in the grid. With this
6A system pattern as defined in Zhou et al. (2010) consists of congested transmission lines and marginal
generation units.
7There can also be some buses with αi > 0 due to the network effects.
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information it is still hard to sign of the second term of the above equation since it depends on
the sensitivity of α. The hybrid GenCo is best to further lower their wind bid in the day-ahead
market until either dpi
dpdw
= 0 or until they withhold all their wind capacity, i.e., pw = 0.
From the analysis above, we can see the profitability of strategic wind bidding depends on
the network sensitivity. Given that conventional generation units do not change their supply
offers, it is the load pattern that determines network sensitivity. As discussed in Zhou et al.
(2010), the shadow price σl of line capacity is a linear function of load at a give bus. It is
also known that location marginal price (LMP) is a function of line capacity shadow price,
LMPi = p +
∑
l
τi,l · σl. Only the congested line l affects the LMP at bus i. In peak hours,
demand is more likely to create congestion on the grid and cause higher LMP. Therefore load
perturbation in the peak hour has a bigger impact on the LMP, and hence GenCo’s profit.
Given that wind power is generally treated as negative load, similar reasoning can be used to
determine the affects of wind power on system LMPs.
5.3.3 Net-Earnings of Firms Reporting Wind Supply Offers Strategically
We now show the effects of company M ’s wind bidding strategy of under-reporting supply
offers (relative to real-time market) on net-earnings of conventional GenCos in a 5 bus test case.
The topology of the network is shown in figure 5.2 above. In addition to the conventional
generation resource, we add wind production on bus 5, which replicates the situation that the
wind plant is located in a remote area. The penetration of wind power is scaled to 3% of
total installed generation capacity, which is as observed in MISO region. Following the analysis
of the last section, we test the case that wind farmer withholds ALL the capacity from day-
ahead market. The simulation compares the revenues of the 5 conventional generators, with
and without wind capacity withholding behavior. The results are listed in Table 5.4 (dollar
amount) and Table 5.5 (percentage change). It is noticed that, the impact of withholding is
different from generator to generator, and hour to hour. Particularly, it has a bigger impact
on GenCo 3 and 5, but very little on GenCo 4. Also, the impact of wind withholding is most
significant at hours 17 and 18, which are the peak hours. It is observed that wind witholding
could even have negative effect on GenCo 3’s net-earnings in hour 18.
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Figure 5.2 5- Bus Grid with Wind Plant
The results provide insight into the incentives of companies with mixed generation portfolios
to report their wind supply offers strategically. As shown in section 5.3.1, we see that ownership
structure in MISO provides precisely such an incentive to engage in strategic reporting of wind
supply offers. In the following section we provide a more rigorous model to study the strategic
incentives of an MGC company.
5.4 Two-Bus Grid: Analytical Model of Strategic Wind Trading
To display the wind bidding strategy of a mixed generation profile company (MGC), we
will now use the following (Fig. 5.3) a two-bus grid example, where conventional GenCos G1
and G2, and LSEs L1 and L2 are located buses 1 and 2, respectively. The wind plant W is
located at bus 1 and is owned by the same company (MGC) that operates G1.
The model setup is as follows:
• Let pG1 and pG2 be the power injected by the two conventional GenCos at their respective
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Table 5.4 Extra Net-Earnings from Wind Withholding (dollar)
hour GenCo 1 GenCo 2 GenCo 3 GenCo 4 GenCo 5 SP Change
0 10.58 1.33 4.94 0.00 40.38 NO
1 9.66 1.18 3.63 0.00 36.38 NO
2 9.32 1.11 3.00 0.00 34.75 NO
3 8.92 1.06 2.59 0.00 33.12 NO
4 5.20 0.61 0.99 0.00 19.16 NO
5 9.57 1.13 2.76 0.00 35.46 NO
6 9.76 1.15 2.98 0.00 36.26 NO
7 11.82 1.43 4.62 0.00 44.35 NO
8 12.05 1.53 6.33 0.00 46.22 NO
9 14.29 1.89 9.64 0.00 55.81 NO
10 14.92 2.00 10.65 0.00 58.54 NO
11 15.00 2.02 10.92 0.00 58.99 NO
12 19.71 2.64 15.46 0.00 77.44 NO
13 18.40 2.44 13.69 0.00 71.96 NO
14 15.72 2.07 10.84 0.00 61.31 NO
15 19.62 2.59 14.39 0.00 76.60 NO
16 16.56 2.23 12.57 0.00 65.17 NO
17 0.90 0.00 (392.21) 1.17 188.36 Yes
18 1.66 0.09 2278.41 0.00 138.42 Yes
19 14.83 2.03 11.46 0.00 58.84 NO
20 13.53 1.85 9.82 0.00 53.51 NO
21 11.64 1.57 7.49 0.00 45.83 NO
22 10.86 1.43 6.16 0.00 42.26 NO
23 10.13 1.30 4.91 0.00 38.91 NO
buses. The quadratic cost functions of the GenCos are:
C1(pG1) = a
s
1 · pG1 +
1
2
bs1 · p2G1
C2(pG2) = a
s
2 · pG2 +
1
2
bs2 · p2G2
where asi , b
s
i for i = 1, 2 are the true cost function parameters of the GenCos.
• Let pL1 and pL2 be the power withdrawn by the two LSEs at their respective buses. The
quadratic benefit functions of the LSEs are:
B1(pG1) = a
d
1 · pL1 −
1
2
bd1 · p2L1
B2(pG2) = a
d
2 · pL2 −
1
2
bd2 · p2L2
where adj , b
d
j for j = 1, 2 are the true benefit function parameters of the LSEs.
• The wind plant injects power prw in the real-time markets, while it strategically reports
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Table 5.5 Extra Net-Earnings from Wind Withholding (%)
hour GenCo 1 GenCo 2 GenCo 3 GenCo 4 GenCo 5 SP Change
0 18.47% 648.05% 0.45% 0.00% 3.02% NO
1 16.77% 525.42% 0.50% 96.60% 2.79% NO
2 16.18% 498.92% 0.58% 0.00% 2.71% NO
3 15.44% 449.52% 0.61% 0.00% 2.61% NO
4 8.48% 126.99% 0.29% 0.00% 1.51% NO
5 16.77% 578.29% 0.72% 0.00% 2.81% NO
6 17.13% 609.16% 0.70% 0.00% 2.86% NO
7 21.35% 1260.87% 0.75% 0.00% 3.45% NO
8 21.50% 1071.53% 0.51% 0.00% 3.44% NO
9 26.16% 2231.17% 0.51% 0.00% 4.03% NO
10 27.52% 2836.38% 0.51% 0.00% 4.20% NO
11 27.67% 2847.00% 0.50% 0.00% 4.21% NO
12 39.61% 1000.00% 0.74% 0.00% 5.62% NO
13 36.23% 97386.57% 0.72% 0.00% 5.26% NO
14 29.56% 5099.91% 0.60% 0.00% 4.46% NO
15 39.58% 1000.00% 0.80% 0.00% 5.64% NO
16 31.40% 7322.44% 0.58% 0.00% 4.67% NO
17 1000.00% 0.00% -2.06% 0.83% 10.90% Yes
18 2.97% 67.54% 84.32% 0.00% 9.62% Yes
19 27.11% 2292.11% 0.44% 0.00% 4.12% NO
20 24.21% 1355.98% 0.39% 0.00% 3.75% NO
21 20.24% 717.38% 0.33% 0.00% 3.23% NO
22 18.77% 603.85% 0.34% 0.00% 3.04% NO
23 17.47% 526.13% 0.37% 0.00% 2.87% NO
supply amount pdw in the day-ahead market. It is assumed that the wind plant can
accurately forecast it’s real-time power output.
• After receiving GenCo supply offers and LSE demand bids, the ISO solves economic
dispatch (ED) problem by maximizing the total net benefit subject to physical network
power-flow, and generator capacity constraints. It is assumed that the wind power is
used (as bid by wind plant) by ISO before the conventional GenCos because of the near-
zero marginal cost of production. ISO’s economic dispatch problem can be formulated as
follows:
max
pG1,pG2,pL1,pL2
∑
j=1,2
(
adj · pLj −
1
2
bdjp
2
Lj
)
−
∑
i=1,2
(
asi · pGi +
1
2
bsip
2
Gi
)
Subject to:
pG1 + pG2 + pw = pL1 + pL2
− T ≤ pG1 + pw − pL1 ≤ T
− T ≤ pG2 − pL2 ≤ T
pG1 ≥ 0, pG2 ≥ 0, pL1 ≥ 0, pL2 ≥ 0
(5.4)
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   Bus	  2	  
Figure 5.3 Two-bus grid example with mixed generation portfolio company (MGC)
The solution of ISO’s problem results in optimal dispatch amounts p̂G1(qw) and p̂G2(qw)
for all GenCos, and LMPs l̂mp1(pw) and l̂mp2(pw).
• It is assumed that the mixed generation portfolio company (MGC) consists of GenCo G1
and the wind plant w. The MGC submits it’s wind supply offer in day-ahead market
strategically so as to maximize the following profit function:
max
pdw
pdG1 · lmpd + (prG1 − pdG1) · lmpr + pdw · lmpd + (prw − pdw) · lmpr − C1(prG1)
Subject to:
pdG1 = p̂G1(p
d
w), p
r
G1 = p̂G1(p
r
w)
lmpdG1 = l̂mp1(p
d
w), lmp
r
G1 = l̂mp1(p
r
w)
pdw ≥ 0
(5.5)
where p̂rG1 and l̂mp
r
G1 are optimal dispatch solutions in real-time markets when wind
plant produces power at the real-time level of prw .
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5.4.1 Analytical Model Results
Case 1: No capacity limit on transmission line
In the case of no capacity limit on transmission line connecting the 2 buses, the economic
dispatch logic implies dispatching the cheapest generation unit first, up to its capacity limit,
to serve the system load. Given the absence of capacity limits, as assumed in this model, the
cheapest unit can fulfill the load requirement of the entire system. The same logic also implies
that the ISO uses all of the reported wind supply offer first (because of near zero marginal cost
of production) to serve as much load as possible. We also assume that the wind capacity in
the system is not enough to meet all of load requirement and hence, it is necessary to dispatch
conventional units to meet the residual load. The lagrangian function for ISO’s economic
dispatch problem takes the following form:
L =
∑
j=1,2
(
adj · pLj −
1
2
bdj · p2Lj
)
−
∑
i=1,2
(
asi · pGi +
1
2
bsi · p2Gi
)
+
µ(pG1 + pG2 + pw − pL1 − pL2) + λ1pG1 + λ2pG2 + λ3pL1 + λ4pL2
(5.6)
To simplify the analysis we only consider the case where all dispatch amounts are positive, and
hence, λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0. The dispatch amount and LMP for GenCo G1 in day-ahead
market are:
p̂dG1 =
E + F
G
− b
d
1D2 · pdw
G
(5.7)
where,
E = D2B1 + a
d
1b
s
2B2, F = b
d
1A2C1, G = D1A2 +D2A1
A1 = b
d
1 + b
s
1, B1 = a
d
1 − as1, C1 = as2 − as1, D1 = bd1bs1
A2 = b
d
2 + b
s
2, B2 = a
d
2 − as2, C2 = as1 − as2, D2 = bd2bs2
The LMP for the system (day-ahead and real-time) takes the following form:
lmp1 = lmp2 = a
s
1 + b
s
1 · pG1 = as2 + bs2 · pG2
Given the dispatch amount and LMP, the MGC reports its wind supply offer to maximize the
net-earnings, as shown in Eq.. above. The result of this optimization problem is the optimal
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day-ahead wind supply offer, which takes the following form:
pd∗w = Constant+
prw
2
(5.8)
where,
Constant =
bd1b
d
2(a
s
1 − as2) + bd1bs2(as1 − ad2) + bd2bs2(as1 − ad1)
2bs1(b
d
1b
d
2 + b
d
1b
s
2 + b
d
2b
s
2)
To analyze the optimal day-ahead wind supply offer w.r.t the real-time available wind power prw,
we assume that the GenCos have similar cost function parameters, i.e., as1 ≈ as2 and bs1 ≈ bs2.
Also, it is reasonable to believe that the intercept of load (demand) functions are greater,
in magnitude, than the corresponding cost function intercept parameters, i.e., ad1 ≥ as1 and
ad2 ≥ as2. Under these conditions it is easy to see that Constant ≤ 0. Hence, the optimal
wind supply offer strategy of MGC in the day-ahead market is to report less than the real-time
available wind power, i.e.,
pd∗w <
prw
2
(5.9)
Case 2: Capacity limit on transmission line
In the case of a capacity limit of T MW on transmission line, we can have the following
cases optimal dispatch cases: 1) p̂G1 + pw − p̂L1 ≥ T , which implies congestion in the direct
1→ 2, or 2) p̂G2 − p̂L2 ≥ T , which implies congestion in the direct 2→ 1 8. We first consider
the case when congestion occurs in direction 1 → 2. The Lagrangian for ISO’s OPF problem
takes the following form:
L =
∑
j=1,2
(
adj · pLj −
1
2
bdj · p2Lj
)
−
∑
i=1,2
(
asi · pGi +
1
2
bsi · p2Gi
)
+ µ(pG1 + pG2 + pw − pL1 − pL2) + γ(T + pL1 − pG1 − pw)
+ λ1pG1 + λ2pG2 + λ3pL1 + λ4pL2
(5.10)
Once again, solving MGC’s net-earnings maximization problem from Eq.. results in the fol-
lowing day-ahead wind supply offer:
pd∗w =
prw
2
− a
d
1 − as1
2bs1
− b
d
1
bs1
T
2
(5.11)
8Congestion is the outcome of the OPF problem and hence, it is not technically correct to assume congestion
on a transmission a priori. However, the problem may be motivated by assuming that the GenCo is able to
accurately predict OPF solution, based on supply offer strategies of other GenCos, and hence, can predict
congestion on a transmission line. In this paper, we are not interested in modeling the process used by the
GenCo to predict congestion.
105
Using the same reasoning as in the case with no transmission capacity limit, it is reasonable
to assume that ad1 ≥ as1. Hence, once again we see that the optimal wind supply offer in the
day-ahead market is to report lower than available real-time wind power, i.e.,
pd∗w <
prw
2
(5.12)
When congestion occurs in the opposite direction, 2 → 1, the Lagrangian for ISO’s OPF
problem takes the following form :
L =
∑
j=1,2
(
bdj · pLj −
1
2
adj · p2Lj
)
−
∑
i=1,2
(
bsi · pGi +
1
2
asi · p2Gi
)
+ µ(pG1 + pG2 + pw − pL1 − pL2) + γ(T + pL2 − pG1)
+ λ1pG1 + λ2pG2 + λ3pL1 + λ4pL2
(5.13)
Solving the MGC’s net-earnings maximization problem results in the optimal wind supply
offer of the following form:
pd∗w =
prw
2
+
as1 − ad1
2bs1
+
bd1
bs1
T
2
(5.14)
It is interesting to note that the optimal supply offer in this scenario can be greater than
the real time wind power, i.e., pd∗w ≥ prw, if the following condition for real-time wind power
output were to be true:
prw ≥
ad1 − as1
b1s
+ T
b1d
b1s
(5.15)
In this case, the MGC uses wind power to offset congestion on the transmission line in order to
maximize net-earnings from the conventional generation unit. Hence, we see that exist incen-
tives to under/over-report wind supply offers by companies with mixed generation portfolios
to maximize their overall net-earnings.
5.5 Two-Bus Grid: Numerical Model of Strategic Wind Trading
In this section we present results of strategic wind trading by a mixed-portfolio generation
company, obtained from numerical methods. The method allows to extend analysis to grids
with more than 2 buses. However, to compare the results with the analytical model, the
analysis is done using the same 2-bus grid in Fig. 5.3. We will now briefly describe the
numerical method.
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5.5.1 Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints
Mixed generation company’s optimal wind supply offer strategy is modeled as bi-level opti-
mization problem. The inner problem solves ISO’s optimal dispatch amounts, given the supply
offers and demand bids from GenCos and LSEs, respectively. The MGC then solves for the
optimal wind supply offers by maximizing the objective function, given the optimal dispatch
values as constraints.
max
pdw
Conventional + Wind Power Net Earnings
Subject to:
min
pGi,pLj
ISO’s SCED Objective
Subject to:
Nodal Power Balance Constraint
Transmission Line Capacity Constraints
Generation Capacity Constraints
Generation Non-negativity Consrtaints
The inner problem can be represented using FOC from ISO’s Lagrangian formulation. The
inequality constraints in ISO’s optimization problem take the form of complementarity con-
ditions and hence, the outer problem is sometimes referred to as mathematical problem with
complementarity constraints (MPCC).
5.5.2 GenCo’s Bi-level Optimization Problem
Wind Farm w owns conventional GenCo i. We assume that the conventional GenCos,
including the the one owned by the wind farm report their true supply offers. Wind farm can
report its supply offer strategically to maximize the following profit function:
max
pw
pdci · lmpdi + (prci − pdci) · lmpri︸ ︷︷ ︸
Conventional GenCo net-earnings
− Ci(prGi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Production cost
+ pdw · lmpdi + (prw − pdw) · lmpri︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wind plant net-earning
(5.16)
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The inner level problem is ISO’s optimal power flow problem, where the ISO solves for GenCos’
optimal dispatch levels and nodal LMPs by taking as given the supply offers of the GenCos,
including the wind supply offer.
min
pCj ,fij ,θj
J∑
j=1
(aj · pcj + bj · p2cj)
subject to:
pcj −
∑
i
fji +
∑
i
fij = pLj − pwj , ∀ j ∈ N [lmpj ]
fij = Bij [θi − θj ], ∀ ij ∈ L [γij ]
− fij ≥ −KUij , ∀ ij ∈ L [λ+ij ]
fij ≥ KLij , ∀ ij ∈ L [λ−ij ]
− θj ≥ −θMax, ∀ j ∈ N [α+j ]
θj ≥ −θMin, ∀ j ∈ N [α−j ]
− pcj ≥ −pUcj , ∀ j ∈ N [µ+j ]
pcj ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ N [µ−j ]
(5.17)
The Lagrangian for ISO’s optimal power flow problem is:
L =
J∑
j=1
(aj · pcj + bj · p2cj) + lmpj
(
pLj +
∑
i
fji −
∑
i
fij − pcj − pwj
)
γij(Bij(θi − θj)− fij) + λ+ij(−KUij + fij) + λ−ij(KLij − fij)
α+j (−θmaxj − θj) + α−j (θminj − θj) + µ+j (−pmaxcj + pcj) + µ−j (pmincj − pcj)
(5.18)
The GenCo’s MPEC problem can now be written as a mathematical problem with complemen-
tarity constraints (MPCC), where the objective function is as given in equation (1) subject to
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the following constraints:
pcj : acj + 2bcj − lmpj + µ+j − µ−j = 0, ∀ j ∈ N (5.19)
θj : α
+
j − α−j +
∑
i,ji∈L
Bji · γji −
∑
i,ij∈L
Bij · γij = 0, ∀ j ∈ N (5.20)
fij : lmpi − lmpj − γij + λ+ij − λ−ij = 0, ∀ ij ∈ L (5.21)
lmpj : pcj + pwj −
∑
i
fji +
∑
i
fij = pLj , ∀ j ∈ N (5.22)
γij : Bij [θi − θj ]− fij = 0, ∀ ij ∈ L (5.23)
α+j : 0 ≤ θmaxj − θj ⊥ α+j ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ N (5.24)
α−j : 0 ≤ −θminj + θj ⊥ α−j ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ N (5.25)
λ+j : 0 ≤ KUij − fij ⊥ λ+ij ≥ 0, ∀ ij ∈ L (5.26)
λ−j : 0 ≤ −KLij + fij ⊥ λ−ij ≥ 0, ∀ ij ∈ L (5.27)
µ+j : 0 ≤ pUcj − pcj ⊥ µ+j ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ N (5.28)
µ−j : 0 ≤ pcj ⊥ µ−j ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ N (5.29)
The model is being solved using GAMS solvers.
5.5.3 Numerical Model Results
The two-bus grid presented in Fig. 5.3 is used to solve the numerical model. The LSEs have
fixed demand, and specifically the demand bids (pL) are:
pL1 = 75 MW & pL2 = 100 MW
The capacity limit on transmission line 1→ 2, T = 20 MW. The GenCos have the cost function
attributes and generation capacity limits as shown in Table. 5.6.
Table 5.6 2-Bud Grid for Numerical Model: GenCo Attributes
GenCo Ordinate (a) Slope (b) Lower Capacity (MW) Upper Capacity (MW)
G1 3.07 0.5 0 200
G2 2.11 0.3 0 150
Wind 0 0 0 40
As in the analytical mode, it is assumed that MGC can accurately forecast the real-time
wind output level prw, while it may choose to strategically under/over-report the supply offer,
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pdw, in day-ahead market. The results in Table. 5.7 show the LMPs and power dispatch levels
of the GenCos if the MGC reports true wind supply offer, i.e., pdw = p
r
w.
Table 5.7 True Wind Supply Offer by Firm with Mixed Portfolio of Generation Assets (MGC)
LMP ($/MWh) Dispatch (MWh)
MGC MGC
GenCo1 Wind GenCo2 GenCo1 Wind GenCo2
26.11 26.11 30.57 55.00 40.00 80.00
The results in Table. 5.8 show the LMPs and power dispatch levels when the MGC reports
wind supply offer in day-ahead market, strategically.
Table 5.8 Strategic Wind Trading by Firm with Mixed Portfolio of Generation Assets (MGC)
LMP ($/MWh) Dispatch (MWh)
MGC MGC
GenCo1 Wind GenCo2 GenCo1 Wind GenCo2
30.70 30.70 30.70 55.26 24.43 95.30
It is evident that by under-reporting the day-ahead wind supply offer in this case, the MGC
is able to drive up the LMPs. The net-earnings for the two cases are shown in Table. 5.9.
Table 5.9 Strategic Wind Trading by Firm with Mixed Portfolio of Generation Assets (MGC)
Net-Earnings ($)
True Supply Offer Strategic Supply Offer
1650.35 1920.06
Hence, by under-reporting the MGC is able to secure extra net-earnings from its mix of
generation assets. It is noteworthy, that the revenue from wind plant, by itself, decreases, but
the additional net-earnings from the conventional unit offset the reduction in reduction wind
plant revenues.
5.6 Conclusion
The analytical and computational work presented in sections 3, 4 and 5 illustrates the
incentives of wind power producers to report wind supply offers. It is observed that mixed-
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portfolio generation companies can either under-report wind supply offers to either increase
LMPs at the sites of their conventional generation units, or over-report to offset transmission
congestion. The next step is to extend the numerical model over a larger grid. This would
allow us to study the affects of spatial location of wind plants, as well as, model more complex
ownership structures.
The study was conducted in the absence of any uncertainty in wind power production.
Future studies would include strategic decision of profit-seeking companies, with different risk
preferences, when wind flow and/or energy demand are stochastic. For example, we can study
how mixed generation portfolio companies determine the optimal supply offers for their con-
ventional and wind generation, based on risk valuation measures such as Value-at-Risk (VaR)
and Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR); see, for example, the analysis in [10].
This work should help electric power market participants to understand the value of in-
formation when there exists uncertainty about wind availability and demand levels. It should
also help policy makers to efficiently incorporate greater amount wind energy and demand re-
sponse programs into current power systems by better understanding the behavior of market
participants.
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CHAPTER 6. General Conclusions
Electric power industries around the world have undergone restructuring - from govern-
ment regulated to more market oriented. However, electric power is not a tradeable asset in
the classical sense since storage costs are prohibitively high. This is a very fundamental fac-
tor distinguishing electric power markets from other markets. Additionally, the recent moves
towards greater self reliance for energy needs, as well as driven by a need to switch to cleaner
renewable generation sources, wind power has gained focus through various political initiatives.
Hence, the study of electric power as an economics commodity presents special challenges.
In this thesis, we investigate the risk management issues of market participants and overall
market efficiency at the wholesale power markets (individual and market operators). We also
study how the market rules dealing with renewable energy sources affect market participants’
strategic trading behaviors.
In chapter 2, we presented the difficulties in objectively measuring market participants’
abilities to exercise market power owing to the physical characteristics of electricity. Using
a wholesale power market test-bed (AMES), we studied the efficacy of various traditional, as
well as newly proposed, measures of market performance, in a dynamic setting with learning
agents. It is observed that Lerner Index (LI) and Market Advantage Index (MAI) correctly
indicate diminishing ability to exercise market power by market participants, as the level of price
sensitivity increases. On the other hand, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) can be misleading,
indicating the potential to exercise market power, when no potential exists. Similarly, Residual
Supply Index (RSI) can be misleading, indicating no potential to exercise market power, when
such potential does exist, as indicated by positive values of LI and MAI.
In chapter 3, we introduced the concept ofprice risk in restructured power markets. We
presented a brief scenario illustrating the origin of price risk and the various measures market
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participants employ to hedge against those risks. We then provided the definition of Financial
Transmission Rights (FTR), and how FTRs can be used along with bilateral contracts to hedge
against price risk. The chapter also presented a survey of research on implications of FTR
market design on overall wholesale power market efficiency.
In chapter 4, we presented a study of joint bidding strategies of market participants in inter-
linked financial and physical energy markets. Specifically, we study how generation companies
bid into ISO organized FTR auctions based on their expectations of payoffs in the day-ahead
energy markets, and the subsequent supply offer strategy in the day-ahead market to maxi-
mize joint net-earnings from energy sales and revenues from the FTRs already acquired. The
results show that Nash-supply function equilibria exist only for certain portfolios of FTRs. It
is also observed that the strategic behavior of generation units changes dramatically for dif-
ferent congestion patterns in the grid. However, even for a simple setup with two identical
generators, it is not easy to solve the problem using purely analytical methods. Hence, we
then used agent-based computational methods to solve for the joint decision making problem.
Generation companies (GenCos) were modeled as adaptive learners in both the markets, in-
teracting repeatedly with other GenCos until they converged to “stable” action choices in the
two markets. The results show that the GenCos are able to learn optimal strategies, based
on spatial location on the grid. Additionally, the GenCos can systematically coordinate their
strategies in the two markets.
In chapter 5 we presented the strategic incentives of companies with both conventional
units and wind plants, to under/over-report wind supply offers in day-ahead markets, relative
to the expected wind power output in real-times markets. We provided empirical basis for
such a study, by using data from Midwest ISO (MISO) markets. The use of analytical models
and numerical methods demonstrates the strategic incentives of mixed generation portfolio
companies (MGC). It is observed, using a 2-bus grid, that MGCs can have incentives to both
under and over-report wind supply offers in day-ahead markets depending on the location of
generation assets, as well as, the congestion patterns.
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APPENDIX A. Optimal Power Flow Calculation
Load-Demand Conditions for Production Decisions
The following grid, Figure. A.1, has GenCos B and S at busses 1 and 2 respectively, while
the LSE is located at bus 3. GenCo B produces at marginal cost, MCB = 10 + 0.01pGB where
the avoidable fixed cost is 10$/MW and pB is MW amount of electricity produced. Similarly,
GenCo S produces at marginal cost, MCS = 13 + 0.02pGS . The LSE at bus 3 demands fixed
load pL MW. It is assumed that the total installed generation capacity at each bus exceeds the
B
1
3
pGB
S
2
pGS
pL=pGS+pGB
Figure A.1 Three Node Grid
load demand at any given time. It is also assumed that the GenCos report their true marginal
costs in energy supply offers to the ISO power pool auction. Analytical solutions for the power
pool trading can be characterized for scenarios with or without congestion in the grid. First,
we will find the load demand conditions under which either/both GenCos are dispatched to
produce electricity in a grid with no binding transmission constraints. The following conditions
must satisfy for the case with no congestion in the grid:
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• The total electricity generation at the two buses must equal the total load demand at bus
3, i.e.
pGS + pGB = pL (A.1)
• Energy price is same across the nodes and equals the marginal cost of producing the last
unit of electricity (LMP) at two production busses.
Π = MCB = MCS
Π = 10 + 0.01pGB = 13 + 0.02pGS (A.2)
where Π is the energy price and because there is no congestion in the grid, the LMPs for buses
1 and 2 are equal, i.e. ΠB = ΠS = Π.
Case 1 : Only ONE GenCo is producing because the load is not high enough to induce produc-
tion from both GenCos. It is immediately apparent that GenCo B is the only one producing
electricity because of the lower marginal cost of production. The upper limit of load demand
level for the condition to hold is the following:
MCB ≤MCS
10 + 0.01pL ≤ 13 (A.3)
Hence, for load demand conditions such that pL ≤ 300MW, only GenCo B serves the load.
Case 2 : Both GenCos are dispatched to serve the load pL > 300 MW. Conditions in equations
2-3 above are still satisfied and by simultaneously solving the two equation, following dispatch
levels are observed at the two production busses.
• GenCo B : pGB = 100 + 2/3pL MW
• GenCo S : pGS = 1/3pL − 100 MW
The energy price (LMPs) across the busses is Π = 11 + .02/3pL $/MW.
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Branch Power Flow Solutions
In this subsection we will derive branch flows through individual transmission lines using
the power flow solutions obtained above. The power flows are derived first for the case without-,
and then extended to the case with binding transmission line constraints. It is assumed that
the reactance on each transmission line is the same and specifically, x12 = x23 = x13 = .2. It is
also assumed that pL > 300 MW so that both GenCos are in operation. The following set of
load-balance and power flow rules are used to obtain individual branch power flows.
pGB + pGS = pL (A.4)
pGB = P13 + P12 (A.5)
pGS = P21 + P23 (A.6)
pL = P13 + P23 (A.7)
where equation (58) represents load-balance condition and equations (59)-(61) represent branch
flows constituting energy injection/withdrawal conditions.
Case1: No Transmission Line Limits Imposed. As shown in Figure. A.2 below, the method
of superposition Kirschen and Strbac (2005) can be used to identify branch flows in the grid
owing to power injections at various busses. Hence, the following conditions for branch flows
must hold,
P13 = P
S
213 + P
B
13
P12 = P
B
123 + (−PS213) = −P21
P23 = P
S
23 + P
B
123 (A.8)
The set of equations show that power flows through transmission lines are comprised of flows
owing to injections at different buses. Again, using the methods in Kirschen and Strbac (2005)
the following formula can be used to obtain branch flow due to power injection at a specific
bus.
Pkm = PTDF
i
km ∗ pGi (A.9)
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Figure A.2 Branch flows via superposition WITH NO transmission constraints
for all transmission lines km ∈ BR and all GenCos i = 1....I, where PTDF ikm is the Power
Transmission Distribution Factor and describes the amount power transmitted through branch
km due to 1 MW injection of power by GenCo i at bus k and to be withdrawn at bus m. The
PTDF for a transmission line is calculated as follows:
PTDF ikm =
∑K
n=1,n 6=k xn∑K
m=1 xm
. (A.10)
Hence, the power flow on transmission line 1→ 3 due to power injected at bus B is,
PB13 = PTDF
B
13 ∗ pGB =
(
.2 + .2
.6
)
∗ pGB = 2
3
pGB (A.11)
Similarly, the power flow on branch 2→ 1→ 3 due to power injected at node S is,
PS213 = PTDF
S
213 ∗ pGS =
(
.2
.6
)
∗ pGS = 1
3
pGS (A.12)
Hence, the total power flow on line 1→ 3 is given by,
P13 = P
B
13 + P
S
213 =
2
3
pGB +
1
3
pGS =
100
3
+
5
9
pL (A.13)
Similarly, the power flows on lines 2→ 3 and 1→ 2 are,
P23 =
4
9
pL − 100
3
P12 =
200
3
+
1
9
pL (A.14)
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The energy dispatch levels and LMPs at various buses are the same as found above for the
unconstrained transmission lines case.
Case 2: Transmission Line Constraint Imposed. Now lets assume there exists a transmis-
sion line limit on line 1 → 3, PU13, and the corresponding load demand at bus 3 is p̂L > 300
MW such that,
P13 = P
U
13 =
100
3
+
5
9
p̂L. (A.15)
In case the load at bus 3, pL > p̂L, i.e. load demand exceeds the critical limit after which line
1 → 3 becomes congested so that P13 > PU13 and power equivalent to P13 − PU13 = 59(pL − p̂L)
must be transmitted in the direction 3 → 1 to decongest the line. The required transmission
flows can be achieved by injecting appropriate amount of power at bus 2 and withdrawing the
same at bus 1. Using the branch power flow rule in equation (63), we know that for 1 MW of
power injected at bus 2 and withdrawn at bus 1, 1/3 MW flows through branch 2 → 3 → 1
and 2/3 MW flows through branch 2→ 1. Figure. A.3 shows the branch flows.
B
1
3
pGB
1 MW
P21 = 2/3 MW
P231 =1/3 MW
x12 = x23 = x13 =0.2
S
2
pGS
1 MW
Figure A.3 Branch flows for ONE MW power injection at Bus 2 and withdrawn at bus 1
The required power of F MW to be injected at bus 2 must satisfy P ∗ 13 = 59(pL − p̂L). Hence,
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P = 53(pL − p̂L) and the implied branch flows are
PS21 =
10
9
(pL − p̂L)
PS231 =
5
9
(pL − p̂L) (A.16)
Using the method of superposition as shown in Figure. A.4 we can obtain the required branch
power flows satisfying the transmission line constraints. The superposition method combines
original power flow solutions from the unconstrained case (eqns 14-15) with the implied power
flows due to additional F MW of power injected at bus 2 (to induce offsetting power transmis-
sion on line 3 → 1 to decongest) to result in power flows through branches that comply with
transmission line constraints.
B
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1
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Figure A.4 Branch flows via superposition WITH transmission constraints
The branch flows are as follows,
P ′13 =
100
3
+
5
9
p̂L
P ′23 = pL −
5
9
p̂L − 100
3
P ′12 =
200
3
+
10
9
p̂L − L (A.17)
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The power dispatch levels of GenCos at the two production busses are the following,
P ′GS = pGS +
5
3
(pL − p̂L) = 2pL − 5
3
p̂L − 100
P ′GB = pGB −
5
3
(pL − p̂L) = 100 + 5
3
p̂L − pL (A.18)
The LMPs at the two production busses are the following,
LMP ′1 = ΠB = 10 + 0.01p
′
GB = 11 + 0.01
(
5
3
p̂L − pL
)
LMP ′2 = ΠS = 13 + 0.02p
′
GS = 11 + 0.02
(
2pL − 5
3
p̂L
)
(A.19)
It is easy to verify that in case no transmission constraints are binding and hence, no transmis-
sion congestion, the results for branch power flows, energy dispatch quantities of GenCos and
the LMPs across the grid are the same as obtained for the no-transmission-constraints case.
The result is proved by replacing p̂L with pL in all the expressions.
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